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IN DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION: ALL
THINGS ARE NOT EQUAL
Derek W. Black*

This Article analyzes the concept of racial stigma in Justice
Kennedy's controlling opinion in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. The
Article reveals that Kennedy's fundamental concern is that
using racial classifications to achieve voluntary desegregation
racially stigmatizes students. In particular,he assumes that
the classifications undermine individualism and reduce
children to "racial chits." He fails, however, to recognize the
purpose of voluntary desegregation and the unique
characteristics that distinguish it from other race-conscious
programs. Kennedy is not alone. Commentators and schools
may have "over-defended" voluntary desegregation,articulating
multiple justifications rather than focusing on the core
justification.
Thus,
this
Article
refines
voluntary
desegregation's purpose. Voluntary desegregation is not an
attempt to obtain the benefits of diversity. It is an attempt to
manage an educational crisis that undermines equal and
quality education.
The lingering effects of past school
segregation continue to stigmatize predominantly minority
schools. As a result, quality teachers and middle-income
students flee to other schools, depriving minority schools of the
key resources for success. Money cannot solve this problem.
The only way to solve the problem is to create a racially
balanced system where race is irrelevant in parents' and
teachers' school choices. To do so, voluntary desegregation
must use creative measures, including some that incorporate
racial classifications. Relying on Supreme Court precedent and
leading scholarship, this Article assesses whether voluntary
desegregation stigmatizes students by: (1) promoting notions of
racial inferiority, whites as racists, or any other stereotypes; (2)
inciting racial politics; (3) undermining individuality; (4)
relying on inappropriate racial labels; or (5) subordinating
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like to thank Dean Kurt L. Schmoke for his continued support of my research.
His first response has always been to meet whatever needs I might have. I
would like to thank Jason Butler for his research assistance. I would also be
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efficiency in moving this article through the publishing process. Last, I would
like to thank Claire Raj and Wendy Parker for carefully reading this Article and
providing invaluable comments.
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relevant values. The Article concedes that Kennedy raises a
valid concern in regard to the particular racial labels, but
concludes that the labels can easily be remedied without
affecting desegregation. In regard to the more substantive
concerns, this Article demonstrates that rather than reinforcing
stigma, voluntary desegregation actually sends
an
antistigmatic message. Kennedy's drive to secure compromise
between competing ideologies causes him to miss the distinct
characteristics and message of voluntary desegregation.
Nonetheless, lower courts must respect the compromise to
ensure that schools are not unduly constrained in their effort to
deliver basic educationalopportunities.

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 11 decided its first school desegregation
case in over a decade, addressing the extent to which a school
district can use race to desegregate. The case, however, was unique
because it involved voluntary rather than mandatory desegregation.
In the rush to distill the basic holding and practical import of the
case, most commentators have yet to examine the theory underlying
the entire decision.2 At its core, Justice Kennedy's controlling
opinion is premised on the notion that racial classifications
stigmatize children. This premise, however, has two flAws. First, it
assumes that all racial classifications are inherently stigmatic.
Second, it misunderstands the context and purpose of voluntary
desegregation.
Kennedy conceptualizes voluntary desegregation
assignments in primary schools as no different from the admissions
selection process in colleges and universities. He assumes both use
racial classifications to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.
This Article seeks to correct this assumption.
The goal of voluntarily desegregating school districts is to meet
their obligation under state constitutions to deliver a quality
education and their obligation under the federal constitution to
deliver an equal education, not obtain the educational benefits of
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. This is not to suggest that other scholarship on the point has not been
valuable, but simply to note a different approach. See, e.g., Stephan J. Caldas &
Carl L. Bankston, III, A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social
Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007 BYJ EDUC. & L.J. 217
(2007) (discussing the historical context surrounding the cases); Samuel
Estreicher, The Non-Preferment Principle and the "Racial Tiebreaker" Cases,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239 (2007) (outlining the opinions); Jonathan
Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to
Remedy De Jure Segregation after Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491 (2008) (dissecting the opinion and its principles to
identify the future impact of the case).
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diversity. In so far as racial isolation creates an educational crisis
that undermines these obligations, voluntary desegregation is not a
preference, it is an educational necessity. 3 Consequently, Parents
Involved raises the most important questions of race and education
to come before the Court in decades. Not only is the case part of
Brown v. Board of Education's legacy, it revisits the continual
debate over whether racial classifications are inherently divisive
and stigmatizing tools.
The Court expressed constitutional concern over stigma as early
as 1879 in Strauder v. West Virginia.4 There, the Court reasoned
that some racial classifications not only deprived citizens of material
benefits, but also stigmatized them.5 In effect, the point of some
racial classifications was to convey the message that AfricanAmerican citizens were unworthy of the same rights as whites.
Even if the message did not deprive African-Americans of tangible
benefits, it harmed them by demeaning their humanity and
intelligence and reinforcing the rationale of racial oppression. This
concept of stigmatic harm became a central tenet in Brown v. Board
of Education6 and has continued to play a significant role in modern
affirmative action cases. 7
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved marks a
continuation of this stigmatic harm theory. His opinion primarily
rests on the notion that by classifying students by race, regardless of
material harm, the school districts stigmatize students.8
In
particular, the crudeness of racial classifications such as "white"
versus "non-white" overgeneralizes. 9 Not only do the classifications
inaccurately categorize students, they imply that whiteness is the
standard by which everyone should be measured. One's similarity
or dissimilarity to whites is a measure of value. This problem can
be corrected simply enough with appropriate classifications, but
Kennedy raises a deeper concern that the very act of classifying
3. As Wendy Parker points out, the real importance of desegregation is in
ensuring equal access to "key educational resource[s]."
Wendy Parker,
Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008). Otherwise, schools
perpetuate a racial hierarchy whereby white students are advantaged over
minority students. Id. at 29-30.
4. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
5. Id. at 308.
6. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (identifying the harm as the stigmatic message
of inferiority).
7. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(asserting that racial preferences stigmatize minorities by promoting a notion of
inferiority).
8. Kennedy assumes the racial classifications in voluntary desegregation
cause a material harm, but he does not explore the assumption. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that
the classifications allocate burdens and benefits, but providing no explanation).
9. See, e.g., id. at 2790-92, 2796-97.
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persons by race is an affront to their individuality.'" In short, racial
classifications inherently stigmatize because they define individuals
based on an irrelevant characteristic.
Kennedy's concerns are warranted in some respects, but he
extrapolates his notion of stigma too far. Stigmatic harms are a
product of cultural context.1
Because race has no inherent
meaning, it has no inherent stigmatizing effects.1 2 Thus, assessing
the purpose and context of voluntary desegregation is necessary to
determine whether its racial classifications stigmatize. Kennedy,
however, pays scant attention to the context in which race is used.
In particular, he fails to even mention or cite the extensive evidence
regarding resegregation trends and the unique educational barriers
they pose.' 3 He only notes that "de facto resegregation" is a
"problem" for schools trying to offer "equal educational
opportunity." 4
In Kennedy's defense, the schools and media may not have done
the best job in refining the core mission of voluntary desegregation.
The stated purpose of voluntary desegregation has vacillated from
achieving diversity, eliminating racial isolation, and improving
interracial relations to achieving the integration promise of Brown."
This vacillating articulation of voluntary desegregation has
prompted higher courts to attempt to reduce or refine those
interests themselves. An en banc panel of the First Circuit, for
instance, noted six asserted compelling interests in voluntary
desegregation, but concluded that they could be reduced to a single
interest in achieving diversity, which was simply the flipside of
eliminating racial isolation. 6 Justice Kennedy also followed this
instinct, noting that eliminating racial isolation was a compelling
interest, but focusing the whole of his analysis on diversity.'7
The focus stems from the Court's previous holding in Grutter v.
Bollinger 8 that the pursuit of diversity is a compelling interest. The
context of higher education admissions, however, is entirely
dissimilar to non-competitive K-12 school assignments. The attempt
10. See infra notes 210-218.
11. See infra notes 120-29.
12. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observationson Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,

27-28 (1994) (explaining race as a social construct).
13.

See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting

Respondents, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915),
2006 WL 2927079.
14. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791.

15. Compare Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 742
(2d Cir. 2000) (finding that the school's interest was in reducing racial

isolation), with Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1998)
(analyzing diversity as a compelling interest).
16. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).
17. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797.

18. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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to situate voluntary desegregation plans as pursuits of diversity
represent failures to understand exactly what these school districts
are doing.
It succumbs to convenience, forcing voluntary
desegregation into pre-established precedent. The purpose of this
Article is to refocus the conversation on the realities of voluntary
desegregation, and then to evaluate the stigmatic harms that
Kennedy raises.
His concerns are appropriate, but different
conclusions follow when one understands the actual problems to
which the school districts are responding.
The point of voluntary desegregation is not to create diverse
learning environments. The point is to control societal forces that
have ravaged minority schools and seriously undermined their
ability to deliver equal educational opportunities for every child.19
Desegregating districts are attempting to create school systems that
will allow them to deliver equal educational opportunities.o
Racially balanced schools are certainly part of this effort, but racial
balance or integration is not an end in itself. In this respect,
voluntary desegregation is distinct from mandatory desegregation.2'
In voluntary desegregation, racially balanced schools are simply
precursors to the conditions necessary to deliver equal educational
opportunities.22 So long as schools are racially identifiable, parents,
teachers, and resources will gravitate toward some schools and away
from others. 2 Moreover, the independent actions of these private
parties are beyond the direct control of schools. The result is a
vicious cycle that drives down the quality of educational
opportunities in poor and minority schools, making them even less
attractive.
Thus, eliminating racially identifiable schools is a
precondition to delivering equal educational opportunities.
Not only do racially isolated schools undermine equality among
schools, they pose a serious threat to the basic quality of individual
schools. Traditionally, the only serious qualitative check on public
education was the watchful eyes of parents with influence. More
recently, however, extensive state-based litigation, as well as
various federal statutes, has created an obligation for schools to not
just make education available, but to deliver a qualitative education
19. See infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
20. See Parker, supra note 3, at 7, 29-30 (indicating that the point of
desegregation is to provide equal access to key educational resources and
prevent whites' advantage in those areas).
21. In fact, some criticized mandatory desegregation's focus on racial
balance, at the expense of quality educational opportunities. See, e.g., Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in

School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93, 505-15 (1976)
(discussing the conflict between attorneys who seek to pursue the strategy of
school integration and the community interest in obtaining an improved
education).
22. Parker, supra note 3, at 38 ("Integrated education is thus a first, crucial
step for quality of education for all children.").
23. See infra notes 94-95, 295-97 and accompanying text.
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that prepares students for grade promotion, graduation, college, and
the work force.24 The constitutions of all fifty states obligate them to
provide public education. 25 Moreover, the supreme courts in many
states have interpreted those constitutional clauses to include
specific substantive guarantees, such as the right to an adequate,
high-quality, efficient, or thorough education.26 Extensive state
statutes expand on these rights.27 Federal statutes, such as the No
Child Left Behind Act and those on behalf of disabled, homeless, and
language minorities, create an additional overlay that obligates
states to close achievement gaps and ensure positive academic
outcomes for all children.
Voluntary desegregation is not only a
commitment to equitable opportunities, it is a response to state
constitutions and various federal mandates to deliver a quality
education.
Understood from this perspective, the legal analysis of racial
classifications in voluntary desegregation is far different than
Kennedy's. These specific racial classifications do not stigmatize. In
fact, these racial classifications cross a threshold largely unseen in
our history: they are the means by which to limit the relevance and
stigmatic effects of race. Colorblindness theory argues that the way
to make race irrelevant is to stop relying on race.2 9 Schools that are
voluntarily desegregating test that theory by showing that race only
becomes irrelevant when race is used to make schools racially
24. See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational
Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 150005 (2007) (discussing the history of state-based education litigation and the
rights it established).
25. Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to
Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 96-97 (1989)
(discussing the constitutional right to education in forty-eight states); see also
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884-86 (W. Va. 1979) (outlining the
constitutional education mandates for thirty-five states).
26. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212
(Ky. 1989) (finding education to be a fundamental right); Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328, 339 (N.Y. 2003) (recognizing a state
constitutional right to a "sound basic education"); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C.
336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (recognizing a state constitutional right to
a "sound basic education"); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,
540 (S.C. 1999) (requiring "the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally
adequate education"); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877-78 (enumerating a number of
rights implicit in the state's basic constitutional right to an education).
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1253.13:1 (West 2006).
28. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
1400-1482 (2006); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C §
1703(f) (2006); No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat.
1425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2006)) (addressing the
need to improve academic achievement of low-income students); McKinneyVento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (2000).
29. john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F.L.
REV. 889, 892-97 (1995) (discussing colorblind theory).
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indistinguishable. Race may matter in the hearts and minds of
some people, but when schools are racially balanced, individual
racial motivations become irrelevant in the choice of where to teach
or send one's child to school. Thus, voluntarily desegregating school
districts do not send a message of racial difference; they send a
message that race will no longer divide schools. ° This message
furthers the notion that all schools are "our" schools, and the
students therein are all entitled to a quality education.3 '
In these respects, voluntarily desegregating schools are no less
than the flowering of Brown's legacy. These schools' perspectives
have entirely reversed. While they once resisted integration, they
now see it as an educational imperative. In addition, by improving
the quality of schools and offering parents choice among them,
voluntarily desegregating schools have secured widespread support
among parents. 33
Thus, voluntary desegregation represents a
convergence of interests between communities of color and whites
that has rarely been seen since Brown."
The holding in Parents Involved places this legacy in jeopardy.
Kennedy's opinion erects new barriers to voluntary desegregation
that can discourage litigation-averse school districts and embolden
opponents. A careful reading of his opinion, however, suggests that
his intent was not to stop desegregation, but to secure a compromise
between competing ideologies. Lower courts must not transform
Kennedy's ideological discussion into concrete legal prohibitions,
which favors colorblindness, without also accounting for the factual
predicates of his opinion. Those predicates envision different
30. Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans:
Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DuKE L.J.
781, 837-38 (2006).
31. See, e.g., McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
854 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
32. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2806-10 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting Jefferson
County's previous resistance to desegregation), with McFarland, 330 F. Supp.
2d at 854 (discussing the district's attempt to create a community of one). See
also Derek W. Black, The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation and the
Importance of Goodwill, Good Sense, and a Misguided Decision, 57 CATH. U. L.
REV. 947, 953-54 (2008) (comparing the national shift in education that Brown
created).
33. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMEs, July
20, 2008, (Magazine), at 43 (discussing an eighty-eight percent parental support
rating for Louisville's desegregation plan).
34. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("The interest
of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites."). Bell indicates that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 also represented interest convergence, but the country quickly
retreated from desegregation when it was no longer in whites' interest. Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1059-62 (2005).
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outcomes based on different facts in future desegregation plans.
The failure to appreciate this will undermine both desegregation
and the compromise Kennedy struck.
This Article begins by defining the contours of voluntary
desegregation and exploring the social forces that make it necessary
in carrying out constitutional obligations to deliver equal and
quality educational opportunities to all students. Part II of this
Article assesses whether racial classifications that do not involve a
material benefit or burden can still harm individuals. This section
relies on Supreme Court precedent and a rich body of scholarship,
which reveal that racial classifications can also stigmatize
individuals and occasion intangible harms. The scholarship, in
particular, anticipated that this issue might arise in regard to future
voluntary efforts to desegregate. Part III of this Article deconstructs
the theory of stigmatic harm that forms the basis of Kennedy's
holding. The Article then tests this theory against factual realities,
Supreme Court precedent, and relevant scholarship, demonstrating
flaws in Kennedy's opinion. The final part of this Article, however,
finds that Kennedy's opinion must also be understood as an act of
compromise rather than principle, which explains the various
inconsistencies and inaccuracies of the opinion. The Article ends by
emphasizing the opportunities and threats embodied in his
inconsistencies.
I.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DELIVER AN EQUAL AND QUALITY
EDUCATION TO ALL

A.

The Purpose and Necessity of Voluntary Desegregation
Voluntary desegregation is an act by a school district to reduce
racial school segregation even though it has no legal obligation to do
so. In the past, schools desegregated only because federal courts
required desegregation as a remedy for past discrimination and
segregation.3 5 Today most schools are free from court orders.36
Thus, desegregation is voluntary and not an attempt to remedy de
jure segregation.
35. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)
(demanding, in response to local recalcitrance, that schools adopt desegregation
plans that work and work now to desegregate schools and eliminate the vestiges
of discrimination); see also Philip T.K. Daniel, Accountability and
Desegregation:Brown and Its Legacy, 73 J. NEGRO EDUC. 255, 263-64 (2004).
36. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BECOMING LESS SEPARATE? SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF
UNITARY STATUS 22-23 (2007), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/092707

_BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf (indicating that the Department of Justice's
school desegregation docket has been cut in half since 1984).
37. See generally Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's
Goal of EducationalEquity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 210
(2005) (discussing voluntary desegregation as distinct from court-ordered
HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 114 2009
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Rather, schools might desegregate to obtain the educational
benefits of a diverse learning environment,8 to improve interracial
interactions in and outside of schools,39 to promote a message of
racial unity,4° to reduce residential segregation 4 ' and for various
other derivative purposes.42 Providing equal and quality educational
opportunities at every school, however, must be the foremost
justification for voluntary desegregation.
Other purposes may
intersect with achieving equal and quality educational
opportunities, but the pursuit of equal and quality opportunities is
distinct from other purposes in terms of its urgency, rationale, and
required methods.
State constitutions place an obligation on every public school in
this country to deliver an education to its students.4 3 Many state
supreme courts have further specified that the constitutional
obligation includes a qualitative component, described as sound
basic, adequate, high-quality, or efficient education.4 Thus, merely
desegregation).
38. See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Champaign Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 944, 984 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (indicating an elementary school recruitment
program should focus on racial and economic diversity); Hampton v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (explaining that
racial balance is necessary "to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society").
39. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328,
344-45 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing interracial conflict prior to the plan and the
need to address it); see also

ROBERT L. CRAIN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., A
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF A METROPOLITAN VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION PLAN

(1984) (finding that K-12 desegregation produced positive interracial contact
later in life).
40. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (recounting the school's mission as being to create "a system of
roughly equal components,. . . not one Black and another White," and further
that "[i]t creates a perception, as well as the potential reality, of one community
of roughly equal schools").
41. Brief for Respondents at 3 n.2, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 2944684
(discussing how the Board believes the assignment plan has assisted in racially
integrating housing since the 1970s).
42. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CiviL RIGHTS PROJECTPROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND
THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 11 (2007).

43. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884-86 (W. Va. 1979) (outlining
constitutional education mandates for thirty-five states).
44. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1993) ("[W]e
believe the right to equal educational opportunity is basic to our society."); Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) ("Equality is
the key word here. The children of the poor and the children of the rich, the
children who live in the poor districts and the children who live in the rich
districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an adequate
education."); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878 ("[T]he Thorough and Efficient Clause
requires the development of certain high quality educational standards, and...
it is in part by these quality standards that the existing educational system
must be tested.").
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opening schoolhouse doors and providing books and teachers is far
from sufficient to meet this obligation. Moreover, both state and
federal laws require schools to deliver this qualitative education
equally among their students."
The unfortunate reality, however, is that racial segregation
prevents • many
school systems from delivering an equal or quality
46
education. Various nuances and policies, from taxation rates and
governmental neglect to municipal overburden, contribute to
inequality. 7 But racially isolated minority schools fail to provide
equal quality educational opportunities for two harsh reasons. Most
white and high-income parents will not send their children to
"black" schools, 48 and most quality teachers will not teach in "black"
schools for any substantial length of time. 49 These two facts result
45. State-court decisions such as those in note 44, supra, require states to
deliver a specific level of education to all students. The relevance of federal law
to this delivery of education, however, is complicated by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which it refused to recognize education finance
or quality as raising equal protection issues. In a forthcoming article, I will
explain why the principles established in these recent state-court decisions
should also eliminate barriers to federal equal protection claims.
46. Comfort ex rel. Neumeyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d
328, 355-56 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing expert testimony on the effect of
racial isolation); Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race
and Education, 16
BROOKINGS
INST.,
Spring 1998, at 28-31,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/spring-education-darling
-hammond.aspx.
47. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 394 (N.J. 1990) ("The social and
economic pressures on municipalities, school districts, public officials, and
citizens of these disaster areas-many poorer urban districts-are so severe
that tax increases in any substantial amount are almost unthinkable.").
48. See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF
APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 22-23, 49-51 (2005); Erica Frankenberg &
Chungmei Lee, Charter Schools and Race: A Lost Opportunity for Integrated
Education, EDUC. POL. ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Sept. 5, 2002, at 6-7,

http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/vlln32 (revealing that giving parents vouchers or
choice resulted in white flight that perpetuated racial stratification); Robert
Hanley, Island in a Sea of White Resistance: Englewood's Neighbors Oppose All
Regional School Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at B1.
49. See ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,
SEGREGATION
OF
AMERICAN
TEACHERS
34-39 (2006),
available at

http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/segregation-american
_teachersl2-06.pdf (demonstrating that as the percentage of minority students
in a school rises, the qualification and experience level of teachers therein tends
to decrease); Catherine E. Freeman et al., Racial Segregation in GeorgiaPublic
Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes, and Impact on Teacher Quality, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SouTH TURN BACK? 148, 157-59 (John Charles Boger

& Gary Orfield eds., 2005); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The BlackWhite Test Score Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, BROOKINGS
INST., Spring 1998, at 26, available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles
/1998/spring-education-jencks.aspx ("Predominantly white schools seem to

attract more skilled teachers than black schools . . . ."); Jay Mathews, Top
Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002, at A5 (discussing
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in conditions that depress the quality of education in minority
schools. The foregoing is not to suggest that minority students need
to sit next to white children to learn, but to acknowledge that
resources, high-income students, and quality teachers follow white
schools and that those factors are crucial to learning.
Although some parents and resources follow white schools for
legitimate nonracial reasons,5 ° for many the reason stems from a
history of state-imposed racial oppression. Decades of previous
discrimination have a direct impact on private perceptions of race
that continue to linger. Schools, in particular, were structured to
send the message that blacks were inferior to whites.
Through
schools and other institutions and policies, many individuals learned
to perceive anything "black" or minority as negative.5 2 Thus, today a
public school that is identifiable as black is still almost invariably
perceived as being a bad school.53 Once a school is perceived as
black, almost no white parents who can choose otherwise will send
their child there or buy a house in a nearby neighborhood.54 Many
middle-class black parents react the same way."
This negative perception leads to high-poverty minority schools
that experience important resource deprivations in many areas,
including teachers. Even a school with a diverse student body will
become almost entirely segregated if parents perceive it to be a
"black" school. The problem is not that the schools become allminority, but that as a consequence of their makeup, most will
become socioeconomically segregated.
More than seventy-five
the dearth of high-quality teachers in low- income schools); Parker, supra note
3, at 35-37 (evaluating research showing that white teachers tend to leave
high-minority schools).
50. See, e.g., John W. Porter, A Policy Statement on Urban School
Desegregation, in

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT

8-9

(1979); Parker, supra note 3, at 34 (indicating that teachers choose schools
based on many factors, including but not limited to proximity, facilities, school
leadership, curriculum, and friends); Hanley, supra note 48, at B6 (identifying
lack of "educational quality" as a reason why whites do not send their children
to urban schools).
51. See generally Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure
for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(1992) (discussing the invidious value that segregation inculcated).
52. See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1257-59 (2002); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,

1202-03 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336-39
(1987).
53. See
generally INGRID
GOULD
ELLEN,
SHARING
AMERICA'S
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RACIAL INTEGRATION 4-5 (2000).

54. Id. at 130 (discussing lack of white receptivity to the idea of a
neighborhood with an increasing minority population).
55. Id. (finding that black families with children also fear black growth in
their neighborhoods).
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percent of predominantly minority schools are also high-poverty
schools.56 High poverty levels at predominantly minority schools
deprive students of the invaluable influence of middle- and upperclass peers, which some argue is the most important factor in the
success or failure of a school.57
The concentration of poverty in a school reduces students'
chances of academic success, regardless of race. Both minority and
nonminority students who attend schools with low levels of poverty
score substantially higher on standardized tests than do students
who attend high-poverty schools.58 Some studies have found that
the achievement gap between high- and low-poverty schools is
equivalent to two years of learning. 59 Likewise, regardless of
56. ANURIMA BHARGAVA ET AL., NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC. &
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12
SCHOOL INTEGRATION 14 (2008) [hereinafter STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE].
Intensely segregated schools are schools whose student body is ninety percent
or more students of color. Id. at 12.
57. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUND., RESCUING
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS

6-7

(2007) [hereinafter
available
at
http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/districtprofiles.pdf;
ALAN GOTTLIEB,
Economically Segregated Schools Hurt Poor Kids, Study Shows, NEWS &
ANALYSIS ON Soc. REFORM FROM THE PITON FOUND., May 2002, at 1; Molly
McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the
Public Schools, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2004) (arguing the best way to
reach the goal of Brown is desegregation by economic class); see also John
Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"? Racial Resegregation, High-Stakes
Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1375, 1419 (2003) (discussing findings of a report presented to Congress
highlighting the achievement gap found between students in high-poverty and
low-poverty schools, and noting the disproportionate number of minority
students in high-poverty schools); Mary Jane Lee, How Sheff Revives Brown:
Reconsidering Desegregation'sRole in Creating Equal EducationalOpportunity,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 485, 518 (1999) ("While they may disagree as to how to 'sort
out the respective weights of the effects of race and class in perpetuating
the ... underclass,' it is indisputable that race and class interact.") (citation
omitted); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272-96
(1999) (discussing the concentration of minorities in center-city schools and the
fact that such schools are more expensive to run and tend to be isolated by
poverty).
PURSUING

PURSUING

58.

SOCIOECONOMIC

SCHOOL

SOCIOECONOMIC

INTEGRATION

SCHOOL

INTEGRATION],

See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21-22 (1966); KAHLENBERG, supra note 57; UNC
CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICY 1-4.

(2005),
available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/civilrights/briefs
/charlottereport.pdf [hereinafter SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS]; McUsic, supranote 57, at 1355-56.
59. See generally SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
supra note 58, at 1-4. One study found that schools with low levels of poverty
are twenty-two times more likely to be high performing than schools with high
poverty levels. DOUGLAS HARRIS, ENDING THE BLAME GAME ON EDUCATIONAL
INEQUITY: A STUDY OF "HIGH FLYING" SCHOOLS AND NCLB (2006), available at
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individuals' socioeconomic status, students who attend low-poverty
schools perform at a higher level than those who attend highpoverty schools. 60 Thus, poor minority students have a better chance
of academic success at schools with low levels of poverty than
middle-class white students have at schools with high levels of
poverty.
The second consequence of racially isolated minority schools is
to deprive students therein of access to the best teachers. Research
demonstrates that access to quality instruction is the most
important factor, or ranks toward the top, in predicting academic
success.61 Predominantly minority schools experience high levels of
teacher turnover. 2
This turnover undermines stability and
consistency in teaching. In addition, minority schools are constantly
forced to hire new teachers, who are often inexperienced.63
Experienced and quality teachers simply will not teach in
predominantly minority schools for any significant length of time64
Many will not come in the first instance, and others will leave as
soon as they have the opportunity. The reasons teachers prefer
nonminority schools can be both racial and nonracial. For instance,

http://epicpolicy.org/files/EPSL-0603-120-EPRU.pdf.
60. KAHLENBERG,supra note 57, at 6; SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 58, at 1 ("[Middle-income students who attend

high-poverty schools earn lower average test scores than do low-income
students who attend middle class schools."). As a general matter, poor students
who attend middle class schools have higher academic achievement than do
middle class students who attend high-poverty schools. Russell W. Rumberger
& Gregory J. Palardy, Does Resegregation Matter?: The Impact of Social
Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 127, 128 (John Charles Boger &
Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
61. See STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 20; SOCIOECONOMIC
COMPOSITION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 58, at 4 (discussing research
on the effect good teachers have on student achievement); Dan Goldhaber &
Emily Anthony, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement, 115 ERIC
CLEARINGHOUSE ON URBAN EDUC. 1 (2003) (writing that recent research shows
"teacher quality is the most important educational input predicting student
achievement"); Megan Hopkins, A Vision for the Future: Collective Effort for
Systemic Change, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 737 (2008) (indicating the quality of the
teacher is the most important factor in student development, especially for lowincome students of color).
62. See EDUC. TRUST,THEIR FAIR SHARE, How TExAS-SIZED GAPS IN TEACHER
QUALITY SHORTCHANGE LOw-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 6 (2008)
[hereinafter THEIR FAIR SHARE], http://www.theirfairshare.org/resources
/TheirFairShareFeb08.pdf (illustrating how most of Texas' districts, the poorest
and mostly minority, also have the highest rate of teacher turnover);
FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 25-26 (revealing that teacher dissatisfaction
tends to rise as the percentage of minority students in a school rises, making it
more likely that teachers will leave).
63. See THEIR FAIR SHARE, supra note 62, at 4; Parker, supra note 3, at 37.
64. See THEIR FAIR SHARE, supra note 62, at 6; FRANKENBERG, supra note
49, at 42.
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many good teachers simply desire to teach high-achieving students, 5
Yet, the
which can have an unintended disparate impact.
predominant factor dictating a teacher's choice of school is more
likely bound up in the lingering stigma toward black schools. As
Wendy Parker's analysis of teacher mobility in Texas, North
Carolina, and Georgia demonstrates, "race itself influences where
teachers teach, not poverty or achievement rates."66
However, even if many teachers' school choices are simply
reflections of preferences for teaching high-achieving students, those
preferences combine with middle-income parents' refusal to send
their children to high-minority schools to produce a vicious cycle.
High-minority schools lead to high-poverty schools, which lead to
lower achievement. Low achievement leads to teacher attrition and
the inability to attract good new teachers, which further depresses
This vicious cycle creates
scores and increases segregation.
predominantly impoverished minority schools where only four out of
ten students graduate on time. 7 For instance, in the 2004-05 school
year in Baltimore City Schools, a high-poverty and high-minority
school system, only one-third of the students graduated on time. 68
The imminent goal of schools faced with these circumstances is
not improving interracial interactions or achieving the benefits of
diversity. Their goal is academic survival. Racial isolation creates
an educational crisis in which predominantly minority schools are
unable to deliver a constitutionally required adequate education.
Moreover, this can occur even though other schools in the school
district have good teachers and are achieving at high levels. These
school districts are delivering neither an adequate nor an equal
educational opportunity for all.
School systems' options for remedying these problems, however,
are more limited than one might think. Labor obligations often
prevent them from simply reassigning teachers to the schools that
need them.69 Nor can they easily induce teachers to voluntarily
transfer to these schools. Recent studies and evidence indicate that
a school district would have to nearly double a teacher's salary to
induce the teacher to teach at a high-poverty and predominantly
65. See generally STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 21; Eric
A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HuMAN RESOURCES
326, 337 (2004) (finding in a study of teacher transfers in Texas "strong
evidence that teachers systematically favor higher achieving, nonminority,
nonlow-income students"); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE
L.J. 249, 294 (1999).
66. Parker, supra note 3, at 37.
67. STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 21.
68. Id. at 19 tbl.3.
69. See, e.g., David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to
the Schoolhouse: How Legislatures and Courts Shaped Labor Relations for
Public Education Employees During the Last Decade, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 28081 (2001) (discussing a suit by public teachers challenging their reassignments
pursuant to their labor agreement).
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minority school rather than elsewhere. ° Although a school system
could alleviate the problem by reassigning students to different
schools, doing so would prompt immediate parental objection and
potentially result in those parents withdrawing their children from
the system."
Because race is a dominant factor in the unwillingness of
parents and teachers to choose high-minority and high-poverty
schools, changing the racial identity of schools is effectively a
predicate to delivering equitable and quality educational
opportunities to many minority children. Schools cannot change the
racial attitudes of adults, but they can create school systems where
race will not be a factor. Race ceases to be a factor when all schools
in a district are roughly equal in terms of their demographics
because no one can look at the schools and say one is white and
another is black. The Jefferson County School Board made this
point and emphasized its importance when arguing its case in
district court:
The Board also believes that school integration benefits
the system as a whole by creating a system of roughly equal
components, not one urban system and another suburban
system, not one rich and another poor, not one Black and
another White. It creates a perception, as well as the potential
reality, of one community of roughly equal schools.... One of
the ways JCPS meets the competition [with private schools] is
by offering quality education in an integrated setting at every
school.
Once a school system achieves this, racial biases may exist
among parents and teachers, but these biases do not interfere with
the school system's ability to do its job. In effect, by using race to
equalize schools, the school system separates or disentangles itself
from the racial stigma of the society that surrounds it. By ignoring
70. See, e.g., Bill Turque, In Second Year, Rhee Is Facing Major Tests,
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2008, at DZ01 (discussing a proposal to raise teacher
salaries to $120,000 and the resistance of teachers toward it); see also ALLIANCE
FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS IN LowPERFORMING HIGH SCHOOLS 7 (2008), http://www.all4ed.org/files/TeachDist

_PolicyBrief.pdf (indicating that several states already have incentive pay for
low-performing schools, but pay increase alone is insufficient to attract
teachers); Hanusheck, supra note 65, at 350 (finding that a ten percent salary
increase would be necessary for each increase of ten percent in minority student
enrollment to induce white females to teach in the school); id. at 351 (finding
that a twenty-five to forty percent salary increase would be necessary to induce
white females with two or fewer years of experience to transfer from teaching in
a suburban to an urban school).
71. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 244 (6th Cir. 1973)
(discussing white flight in Detroit).
72. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854
(W.D. Ky. 2004).
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race or leaving the racial composition of its schools to chance,
however, a school system allows private societal discrimination to
shape the face of its schools and determine the opportunities
provided therein.
B.

Voluntary DesegregationMethods
Voluntary desegregation, however, does not simply replicate
past or mandatory
desegregation methods.
Compelled
desegregation is more aggressive than voluntary desegregation,
relying heavily on redrawing school attendance zones,73
consolidating school buildings and districts,74 and busing,75 all of
which entail the involuntary reassignment of students. Involuntary
reassignment of students to schools outside their immediate
neighborhood has engendered significant parental resistance. 6
Racial minorities were sometimes disgruntled,77 but whites tended
to be the only ones who withdrew their children from the system
rather than submit to desegregation. 8
Well-designed voluntary desegregation plans co-opt parents'
reluctance rather than inflame it. They force nothing upon parents
and, instead, allow them to be active rather than passive agents in
school desegregation. Consequently, the effectiveness of voluntary
desegregation is dependent upon the voluntary acts of parents.
Given past resistance, reliance on voluntary parental acts would
appear doomed on its face, but school districts have been able to
create systems, options, and incentives that reshape parental
choices.
First, a school district changes the entire perspective with
which a parent approaches desegregation simply by making school
73. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1971)
(finding that district courts have the authority to alter attendance zones).
74. Powell v. Studstill, 441 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Ga. 1994) (finding that a school
consolidation plan ensured desegregation).
75. Swann, 402 U.S. at 29-30 (sanctioning a district court order to bus
students to non-neighborhood schools); Borders v. Bd. of Educ., 290 A.2d 510,
516 (Md. 1972) (finding "it is constitutionally permissible to require busing to
achieve racial balance").
76. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470-71
(1982) (evaluating a Washington statute that was passed to prevent the busing
of students to non-neighborhood schools); Regan Garner, A School Without a

Name: Desegregationof Eastside High School 1970-1987, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 233, 253-54 (2005) (recounting white resistance to busing and school
reassignment).
77. See Bell, supra note 21, at 485-86 (arguing that many in the AfricanAmerican community preferred school improvement over integration); Joe R.
Feagin, Heeding Black Voices: The Court, Brown, and Challenges in Building a

Multiracial Democracy, 66 U. PIT. L. REV. 57, 77 (2004) (discussing AfricanAmerican opposition to desegregation because of the fear that it "would harm or
destroy black institutions").
78. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Super. Ct., 448 U.S. 1343, 1348 (1980)
(discussing "white flight" in response to desegregation).
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assignments voluntary as opposed to mandatory. 79 Human nature
dictates that parents are more receptive to sending their children to
a school outside their immediate neighborhood if it is the parents'
decision rather than the school district's.8 0 No parent welcomes
outside control or influence over the opportunities his child will
receive. Second, some of whites' historical resistance to mandatory
desegregation has stemmed from the uncertainty about whether
their children would continue to receive a quality and safe education
at another school."' Although some of this resistance is born of
bias,82 some is a fear of the unknown. But when a school system
resolves these uncertainties and can offer quality, if not improved,
schools throughout the system, resistance can be drastically
reduced. Successful voluntary desegregation plans have done
exactly this. 3
Unfortunately, offering choice and improving school quality and
safety alone are often insufficient to desegregate schools. Racial
bias continues to motivate or influence enough individual choices to
prevent overall desegregation. Thus, no desegregation plan that
offers unfettered school choice is likely to be successful. Instead,
desegregation plans must structure and monitor the choices
available to parents. Thoughtful plans strike a careful balance
between offering as many meaningful options as possible, so as to
maintain parental attractiveness, and limiting those options in ways
that ensure desegregation.
School districts can achieve this balance through at least two
means. First, a school district can guarantee every student a
neighborhood school, 4 but also give them the option of transferring
to another school so long as the transfer has a neutral or positive
79. See generally Neal Devins, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning
of the Chicago School DesegregationCases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1267

(1984) (discussing the shift from a desegregation plan that required mandatory
reassignments to one based on voluntary reassignments because they are "the
most effective and most practicable in achieving stable desegregation" (quoting
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
80. See generally Jessica Rae Patton, A Rainbow's Arc, TEACHING PRE K-8,
May 2007, at 45-49.
81. See, e.g., Garner, supra note 76, at 255 (discussing white concerns
regarding school quality).
82. Amy Stuart Wells et al., Tackling Racial Segregation One Policy at a
Time: Why School Desegregation Only Went So Far, 107 TEACHERS C. REC.2141
(2005); Amy E. Wells, Good Neighbors? Distance, Resistance, and Desegregation
in MetropolitanNew Orleans, 39 URB. EDUC. 408, 412-13 (2004).
83. See, e.g., Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d
328, 352-53 (D. Mass. 2003) (describing the educational success of the plan);
Patton, supra note 80, at 45.
84. Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 ("[U]nder the Lynn Plan every
student in Lynn is entitled to attend the school in his or her neighborhood."
"Students have options beyond their neighborhood schools if their proposed
transfers are 'desegregative'-i.e., when they contribute to the districtwide
integration effort.").
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desegregative effect.85 Comfort, Massachusetts has successfully
facilitated these transfers by using state transportation funds to
support desegregative transfers. 8 Such a plan poses no burden to
parents who wish to keep their children in a neighborhood school,
while those who wish to transfer have the option and resources to do
so. Comfort also made curricular upgrades, including specialized
class offerings at some schools, in order to increase the
attractiveness of transfers." The end result was a racially balanced
system. 18
Second, a district can expand the size of school attendance zones
beyond traditional neighborhood zones.8 9 For instance, a school
district can combine a group of elementary schools into a single
larger attendance zone. Parents can then indicate their preference
of schools within this large zone. By carefully drawing attendance
zones and selectively grouping elementary schools, districts can
successfully reduce segregation. 9
Achieving racial balance,
however, requires that they refrain from deferring entirely to
parental preference. Districts must sometimes assign a child to his
parents' second-preference school. 9'
Resorting to a secondpreference school primarily occurs when the first-preference school
is oversubscribed.
In these instances, it may be necessary to rely on racial
tiebreakers, whereby those students who improve or maintain a
school's racial balance are assigned first. Maintaining this balance
is crucial because, even before a school becomes significantly
imbalanced, it can reach a "tipping point" where it rapidly goes from
being relatively integrated to entirely imbalanced.9 ' For instance, a
school might enroll whites as a slight majority for a period of years,
but an increase to forty-five or fifty percent minority may be enough
for others to perceive it as a "black" school. Perception can then
quickly become reality, as nonminorities no longer voluntarily
85. Id. at 348.
86. Id. at 342-43; see also Racial Imbalance Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71 §§
37C, 37D; ch. 15 §§ 1I, 1J, 1K (2000).
87. Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 333-35.
88. According to the facts, all of the high schools in Lynn are "balanced,"
but only two out of five of the middle schools, and none of the elementary
schools, are balanced. Therefore, transferring to these schools would be
prohibited if it would promote racial imbalance. Id. at 348-49.
89. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834
(W.D. Ky. 2004).
90. Id. at 845.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 844-45.
93. Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley, UnderstandingWhite Flight
and Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY,
QuALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 157, 165-71 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981) (reviewing
research finding the tipping point of massive departure of whites to be thirty- to
forty-percent minority enrollment).
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attend the school and it becomes all-black in a matter of just a few
years. Schools can control this tipping point by implementing race
as a factor or tiebreaker in schools that are oversubscribed. By
doing so early and before a school approaches the •tipping
point,
*94•
schools need only rely on the racial tiebreaker in limited instances.

II. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS THAT Do NOT OCCASION
MATERIAL HARMS

A.

The ConstitutionalHarm of Racial Stigma
As explained further in Part III, voluntary desegregation
generally poses no material harm to students. Race discrimination,
however, occurs not only through tangible harms such as the loss of
a job, housing, or admission to a university but also through
intangible harms that affect one's sense of self or the way in which
society views an individual. For instance, intangible harms occur
when the government acts in ways that send the message that a
racial group is inherently different, intellectually inferior, or less
worthy of citizenship. Scholars refer to these injuries as stigmatic
or expressive harms.
Often, material harm accompanies a
stigmatic harm. For instance, school segregation laws sent a
message of black inferiority and also deprived African-Americans of
tangible educational resources and opportunities.
But material
deprivation need not accompany a stigmatic harm for a violation of
equal protection to occur.
The Supreme Court has developed stigma as an independent
harm and, thus, a basis for standing in several of its most important
race cases. "[Wihere the material harm seems slight or problematic"
in discrimination cases,98 the Court has justified its holding with the
need to prevent stigmatic messages of inferiority. For instance, in
Strauder v. West Virginia," the state excluded blacks from jury

service. 0 The Court found the practice unconstitutional, in part,
because the exclusion of blacks was stigmatizing. The Fourteenth
Amendment, although stated in prohibitory terms, includes the
positive right to be free from "unfriendly legislation... implying

94. See, e.g., McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 861.
95. R.A. Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 817 (2004).
96. See Paul Brest, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 52, at 351;
Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 817; see also ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 57-99 (1996) (discussing the

Supreme Court's stigma jurisprudence and the stigma theory scholarship that
has followed it).
97. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
98. Brest, supranote 96, at 9.
99. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
100. Id. at 304.
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inferiority in civil society."1"' Thus, the flaw in the West Virginia
statute was not that it occasioned a material deprivation, but that
singl[ing] out and expressly den[ying] by a statute all right to
participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because
of their color... is practically a brand upon [blacks], affixed by
the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.10 2
Picking up on the importance of this rationale, subsequent plaintiffs
challenged other forms of segregation based on the theory that it
stigmatized blacks.
In fact, the core theory of Brown v. Board of Education,03 which
led to the prohibition of all segregation, was that even when
segregated schools were equal in all tangible respects AfricanAmerican children were still injured by the stigmatic message that
segregation conveyed.' 4 "To separate [black children] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 0
The Court further noted that "the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group."0 6
Thus, the Court held that segregated schools are inherently unequal
because they stigmatize African-Americans. 7
More recently, the Court has treated the threat of stigmatic
harm as a justification for scrutinizing and overturning affirmative
action plans. In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.," 8 the Court wrote
that racial classifications, regardless of their intended purpose,
101. Id. at 308.
102. Id.
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. The Court had previously held that segregation did not stigmatize. In
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the plaintiff argued that segregated
train cars, although not denying blacks the benefit of riding the train, were an
attempt to indicate their inferiority. The Court did not reject the notion that
stigma could occasion a constitutional harm, but denied that "[1]aws permitting,
and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact ... imply the inferiority of either race to the other." Id. at
544. It further added that:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Id. at 551.
105. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 495.
108. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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"carry a danger of stigmatic harm" and "[ulnless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."'0 9 Racial
preferences in the marketplace and academic admissions "may only
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relation to individual worth.""' In short, the Court
argued that affirmative action programs not only materially harm
the disfavored racial group, but stigmatically harm the preferred
racial group.
The Court has also found that racial classifications can
stigmatize without implying racial inferiority. They can send a
more subtle but equally racially offensive or inappropriate message.
For instance, in Shaw v. Reno,"' the consideration of race in vote
redistricting had not denied anyone the right to vote, nor had it
diluted anyone's vote or occasioned any tangible effect on voting
rights.
The state had simply created a majority minority
congressional district that resulted in a "bizarre" or unusually
shaped district. The shape itself did not harm voters. " 2 Thus,
sustaining the plaintiffs claim required the identification of some
other harm.
The Court found the shape of the district could not be explained
on any grounds other than the consideration of race in drawing it.
This predominant consideration of race harmed citizens by
conveying a stigmatic message.1 3 Reiterating its historical concerns
with racial stigma, the Court wrote that racial classifications
"threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in
a racial group and to incite racial hostility.""4 By drawing voting
districts based on race, the state "reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they livethink alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls."" 5 Although not suggesting racial
inferiority, this message furthers a notion of racial difference that is
offensive.
B.

Explaining the Court's Theory of Stigma

Although the Court has established the importance of stigma, it
has never articulated any legal standards for evaluating it. Instead,

109.
110.
(1978)).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Id. at 634-36, 644.
Id. at 657-58.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 647.
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it has recognized stigmatic harms on an ad hoc basis. Scholarship
has attempted to fill this gap and explain the Court's motivations
and its underlying rationales. When government action is "based on
assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference," the intent
to "inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing . .

.

victims as

inferior" is often unmistakable. 1 6 But in the modern context, intent
and stigma are often less explicit. Consequently, the Court's
jurisprudence becomes inconsistent.
Paul Brest finds that the Court has attempted to evaluate this
sort of stigma through its compelling-interest analysis, weeding out
illegitimate classifications based on racial generalizations and
stereotypes from those that do not create stigmatic or material
harms.11 7 This analysis assumes that even well-intentioned uses of
race can have stigmatic effects and involve subtle notions of racial
inferiority or difference. Brest, for instance, reasons that racial
quotas in public housing or schools are designed to maintain
integration but they can "convey[ ] the stigmatic message that
whites cannot tolerate too many minority persons."118 In such cases,
the Court must determine whether a policy actually conveys
stigmatic messages and whether those messages are nonetheless
outweighed by the benefits. 1 9
Charles Lawrence, however, would argue that a compellinginterest analysis cannot fully evaluate stigma because it focuses too
120
much on governmental intent and the basic operation of a policy.

To identify stigma, one must look to the social context that
surrounds a legal dispute. Stigma becomes part of the social fabric
and oppresses individuals in ways beyond the policy at issue in a
case. 121 Moreover, because stigma is largely a function of the context
122
in which it occurs, governmental intent may often be irrelevant.
Neither intent, nor a basic act itself, will necessarily stigmatize. A
stigmatic "message obtains its shameful meaning from the historical
and cultural context in which it is used and, ultimately, from the
way it is interpreted by those who witness it.'

' 123

For instance,

asking women to use separate restrooms from men does not impose
a stigma on either group, while asking African-Americans to use
separate restrooms from whites would, because the latter derives a
116. Brest, supra note 96, at 8.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at 21 (noting that the court's task is to "assess the extent to which
[an apparently benign race-dependent practice] ... seems to reflect
assumptions of racial inferiority or selective indifference and whether it seems
likely to inflict stigmatic injury or add to cumulative harms").
120. Lawrence, supra note 52, at 351-53.
121. Id. at 351 (stating that stigma signals an "inferior status [that]
designates [one] as an outcast" from society).
122. Id. at 352-53.
123. Id. at 351.
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129

negative meaning
from our cultural and historical context, while the
12 4
former does not.
The state, however, can stigmatize individuals without even
intending to. 12 5 For instance, Lawrence points out that, in an effort

to improve the competency of its police officers, a city may rely on a
standardized test in hiring that has a disparate impact on minority
applicants. 2 6 Assuming a context where a police force formerly
excluded African-Americans and still employs only a few, the
community may interpret the test as indicating that AfricanAmericans as a group lack the qualifications to be officers, or that
the city does not want to hire them. 127 The relevant inquiry in
determining stigma is not the defendant's intent but the "cultural
meaning" of a particular act. 128 If the perceived meaning is
stigmatic, the Constitution should prohibit it regardless of the
actor's intent. In short, Lawrence concludes that the culturally
contingent stigmatic message of a governmental
act should be one of
29
the measures of an equal-protection violation.
Robin Lenhardt posits that stigma carries an even higher legal
significance, arguing that stigma is more than simply an important
component of discrimination. 0 "[R]acial stigma, not intentional
discrimination or unconscious racism, is the true source of racial
injury in the United States."'
Thus, the law's primary objective
must be to identify and limit stigma. Law, however, will not
identify stigma by searching for a bad actor or perpetrator of
discrimination. Racial stigma is a social construct that exists
independent of the intentions or motivations of individuals.132
Stigmatic meanings133 derive from the consensual meanings that
communities share.

Applying this theory to Supreme Court precedent, Lenhardt
credits the Court for recognizing some stigmatic harms. 134 She,
however, reveals the Court's inconsistency with regard to stigma.
124. Id. at 351-52.
125. Id. at 352-53.
126. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (finding that
despite the differential racial effect of the test, there was no intentional
discrimination).
127. Lawrence, supra note 52, at 373.
128. Id. at 370-72.
129. Id. at 323-24, 355-56.
130. Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 887-88 (arguing that her point, unlike
Lawrence's or Brest's, focuses on racial stigma as the main source of injury to
minorities on an individual as well as a group level).
131. Id. at 809. Moreover, racial stigma "accounts for the persistence of
racial disparities" and intentional discrimination, not vice versa. Id.
132. Id. at 821-22.
133. Id. at 823-24.
134. Id. at 865 (arguing that since the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment,
the Court has viewed it as the main tool to address the harm racial stigma
creates).
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She finds that the Court has overlooked stigmatic harms to
minorities in various
cases while identifying questionable stigmatic
135
harms elsewhere.

Most notably, the Court has suggested that stigmatic harm
occurs simply by recognizing or calling attention to one's race. For
instance, Lenhardt concludes that Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority in Croson, proceeds with the notion that to recognize
blackness is to recognize "otherness," and otherness stigmatizes
blacks.'3 6 Lenhardt rejects this notion because stigma is a function
of context. Thus, recognizing race does not stigmatize unless some
contextual meaning is attached to the recognition.' 37 For instance,
collecting census data by race does not stigmatize anyone, as the
information itself has no social meaning. However, in a context
where monolithic populations were socially equated with isolated,
ignorant, and/or racist populations, one might argue that collecting
census data to highlight those locations might stigmatize. Of
course, such meaning does not attach in our culture and, thus, to
say that a county in Wyoming is all-white is to do nothing but
recognize its demographics and state a fact.
Lenhardt asserts that the Court fails to take these important
contexts into account.
Instead, the Court treats all racial
recognitions and considerations the same: generally objectionable.
According to Lenhardt:
Racial stigma, for the Court, has become a sort of reputational
harm, one that can arise by the mere acknowledgment (or
failure to acknowledge) of racial difference. This superficial
understanding comports with the very narrow, formalistic
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and the notion of
equality that the Court
138 has adopted in its race cases in the last
two or three decades.

Because the Court has "jettisoned" a serious examination of context,
stigma jurisprudence no longer has an objective foundation. 139 Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that "the Court has often regarded racial
stigma as a problem of constitutional dimensions, it is difficult to
predict when or how the Court will deem it necessary even to
mention the potentially stigmatizing effects of a challenged policy or
action. ,140
Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi's scholarship develops a
subcategory of stigma that does not involve racial inferiority or
135. Id. at 866-67 (contrasting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
136. Id. at 870-71.
137. Id. at 914-24.
138. Id. at 875-76.
139. Id. at 877 (concluding the risk of stigmatization is being examined in a
vacuum).
140. Id. at 876.
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differential value.
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, they
identify, what they call, expressive harms in certain acts based on
race.' They write that:
[E]xpressive harms are violations of public understandings
and norms ....
Judicial validation of expressive harms reflects
concern for the way in which public action can cause injury
precisely by distorting or undermining [our norms]. The harm
is not concrete to particular individuals, singled out for
distinct burdens. The harm instead lies in the disruption to
constitutionally underwritten public understandings about the
appropriate structure of values in some arena of public
action. 142
The primary example of these expressive harms occurs in voting
redistricting cases. In those cases, the Court focuses on the social
43
perceptions of the messages sent by the shape of a voting district.
According to the Court, bizarrely shaped, majority minority districts
send the message that race is the most important determining
characteristic in voting. 44 Pildes and Niemi stress that the Court
does not condemn race-conscious programs in general or imply that
race is an illegitimate consideration. 4 ' Rather, the Court objects to
the subordination of other normally relevant values to a single
value.4 6
In effect, the process is corrupted by a single-minded
adherence to race, and conveys a message inconsistent with
constitutional principles. In the context of voting, that message is
that race is more important than geographic, socioeconomic, or any
other political community. Pildes and Niemi further note that a
similar rationale explains prohibitions on quotas in school
admissions because they subordinate merit to race. 147
In sum, the above scholarship confirms the importance of
stigma in race discrimination cases. Even in the absence of material
harm, racial classifications can stigmatize by implying racial
inferiority or difference, or by subordinating other values to race.
However, identifying stigma requires a careful examination of social
context, which is not always developed in the evidence or opinions.
Unfortunately,
the scholarship
also confirms the Court's
inconsistency in fully considering this context. This failure poses a
significant threat to voluntary desegregation. Although this Article

141. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 485 (1993).
142. Id. at 507.
143. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993).
144. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646-48.
145. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 495-99.
146. Id. at 499, 509.
147. Id. at 503-04.
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demonstrates voluntary desegregation's unique context and purpose,
a cursory examination of its use of race might lead one to lump it in
with various other race-conscious programs, toward which the Court
has already expressed various concerns about stigma.
C.

Stigma in School Segregation and Desegregation
Kevin Brown's scholarship, in particular, helps establish a
baseline for evaluating stigma in school desegregation by exploring
its historical context. He identifies the central evil of school
segregation not as the physical separation of students, but as the
inculcation of racist values. 148 The courts, however, failed to directly
address the value inculcation, and instead focused exclusively on
desegregating school buildings."
Brown's analysis is particularly
instructive for voluntary desegregation in so far as it is primarily
reacting to the effects of this inculcative value.
Brown grounds his theory in Supreme Court precedent and
educational theory, which posit that our public schools are cultural
institutions with a primary purpose of indoctrinating values. 5 0
School segregation, however, directly misused this power. By
separating white and black students, the state indoctrinated what
he calls the invidious value, or the belief in the inferiority of
blacks."" Socializing students in an environment premised on this
value stigmatized blacks, but Brown emphasizes that it also harmed
whites by corrupting their values." 2
Although Brown v. Board of Education contemplated this
stigmatic evil, the Court's subsequent holdings were not premised
on remedying it. Remedying the invidious value would require
resocializing students with nonracist values." 3
Desegregating
schools might eliminate unequal opportunities, but desegregation
does not necessarily
respond to the continuing effects of the
54
invidious value.

Brown concludes that the Court overlooked this distinction
because it proceeded with the notion that segregation did not just

148. Brown, supra note 51, at 5.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 7-11; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
681 (1986); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 22-39 (1987) (evaluating the varying theories of
education and each theory's argument regarding the state's right to socialize
children through education).
151. Brown, supra note 51, at 5-6.
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id. at 37.
154. He does note, however, that desegregation is a necessary component of
eliminating the invidious value. Id. at 36-37. As Brown writes, "[wihile
desegregation is not necessary to eliminate the stigmatic effects of segregation
in other contexts, it is necessary in the context of public elementary and
secondary education." Id.
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send the message that blacks were inferior to whites;15 5 it actually
made blacks inferior to whites through unequal opportunities.156
Thus, black students themselves were treated as the problem to be
remedied, rather than the message that students had been taught.
Brown asserts that this remedial perspective ignores the inculcative
harm done to both whites and blacks: the notions of white
superiority and black inferiority.
Ultimately, Brown's concept of intangible constitutional harm
correlates with Pildes and Niemi's expressive harm theory. Like
Pildes and Niemi, Brown sees public and private actors competing
over what values public policy will reflect. With schools, some
parents advocate policies that will perpetuate their personal values,
which may, for instance, be religious or invidious. Schools, however,
are limited in their ability to reflect these values. In fact, they are
obligated to socialize and inculcate students only with those values
that are consistent with the Constitution.1 7 When schools go beyond
these values, such as in inculcating racial inferiority, they violate
the rights of all students, • even
those who might agree with the
158
religious or invidious value.
Likewise, this warped inculcation
violates students' rights regardless of whether it is accompanied by
a material harm. In effect, the inculcative harm of invidious values
is equivalent to Pildes and Niemi's notion that subordinating values
creates an expressive harm. The harm in both flows from the state
promoting a message that is inconsistent with constitutional values.
The foregoing contextualizes the obstacles schools face in
maintaining equitable opportunities, but it also legitimizes
voluntary desegregation as a necessary response to real social
phenomena.
The scholarship, however, goes beyond de jure
segregation to consider whether voluntary desegregation might pose
its own stigmatic risks. In general, the scholarship notes that
voluntary desegregation can pose stigmatic harms, although the
voluntary desegregation that the scholarship addresses is of a
different nature than what is implemented today. Regardless, the
scholarship suggests that, at worst, the benefits of voluntary
desegregation outweigh the threat of stigma.
Whatever concerns might normally exist, recent experiences
with voluntary desegregation largely resolve these stigmatic
concerns. First, today's voluntary desegregation is far less rigid
(allowing for parental choice, for instance) than earlier notions of
voluntary desegregation that were premised on more aggressive

155. Id. at 6, 56-57.
156. Id. Brown concedes that inequality of resources certainly could have
retarded the educational opportunities of blacks, but contends that particular
harm, and its corresponding remedy, is not the primary harm of segregation.
Id. at 36.
157. Id. at 17.
158. Id. at 17-20.
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methods that mirrored mandatory desegregation. Paul Brest, for
instance, conceptualizes voluntary desegregation as relying on rigid
quotas. 59
Nevertheless, he still reasons that voluntary
desegregation is distinct from other race-conscious programs
because of the unique motivations for remedying school segregation:
notions of differential value between racial groups motivate
16
segregation, whereas notions of equal worth motivate integration. 0
Second, he conceives of voluntary desegregation as benefitting
minorities at the expense of whites. He writes that desegregation
"may effectively deprive white individuals of a desired benefitattendance at a neighborhood school." 16' However, as explored later,

current forms of voluntary desegregation do not necessarily deprive
whites of anything. Current forms are aimed at and benefit all
students. In short, the zero-sum game of voluntary desegregation
that Brest conceptualizes no longer exists. However, even assuming
this more drastic form of voluntary desegregation, Brest concludes
voluntary desegregation is unlikely to stigmatize whites and does
not "present any likelihood of cumulative disadvantage to whites
based on race or of the frustration of being denied benefits because
of an unchangeable trait."6 '
Brest's only real concern is that quotas requiring a particular
level of white students could convey a stigmatic message of black
inferiority because they suggest that the presence of whites and the
163
prevention of all-black schools is the measure of school quality.
Again, this concern does not apply to current voluntary
desegregation because it does not rely on rigid quotas that require
mandatory student reassignments, nor is it premised on only
desegregating black schools.
The goal is to desegregate and
integrate all schools to create nonracial schools. Only then can the
educational system ensure a network of roughly equal schools.
Thus, even if quotas were implemented in some form, the quotas
would not be premised on the inferiority of any group, but on the
interdependence of all groups. In any event, Brest is still willing to
dismiss this concern because the schools' motivations are not
stigmatic,
and the benefits of desegregation far outweigh any
64
costs.

In fact, scholars who have addressed the causes of current de
facto school segregation have suggested that redressing it is more
than just a benevolent act of the schools. These scholars reason that
it may be their legal responsibility. Placing his stigma concerns
aside, Brest indicates that the causes of de facto segregation are
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Brest, supra note 96, at 19-20.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 22.
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likely the result, or continuing effect, of past violations of
antidiscrimination principles.16 5 Although a plaintiff might not
convince a court to remedy so called de facto segregation, voluntary
desegregation is necessary to control for racially biased private
decisions that stem from past state discrimination.1 6 6 David Strauss
is even more certain in his approach to de facto segregation. He
argues that voluntary desegregation is not voluntary at all, but in
some instances can be constitutionally required. 167 In so far as the
state-imposed stigmatic harms recognized in Brown persist today,
they are the cause of de facto segregation.1 6 8 Thus, eliminating de
facto segregation attributable to this stigma is simply a remedy to
the original harm of Brown.
Professor Kevin Brown adds even further depth in connecting
de facto segregation with past de jure segregation. He argues
current school and residential choices are directly connected to the
history of school segregation. The state inculcated the invidious
value through schools, and its desegregation remedies never
attempted to counteract that value.6 9 As a result, many of today's
parents continue to hold and act upon those values, replicating the
school segregation that they were taught is desirable.'
Thus, like
Brest and Strauss, Brown finds the state7 is obligated to
affirmatively interrupt the cycle that it initiated.1'
Brown also suggests that, whatever the state's past role in
segregation, today's segregation can send dangerous messages to
students. Those messages alone justify schools' efforts to voluntarily
desegregate.
Brown cautions that not all racial separation in
schools can be presumed to be the result of the stigmatic effects of
the invidious value, but:
[The invidious] value can nevertheless still be inculcated when
the educational quality of schools attended by AfricanAmericans is inferior to that of schools attended by whites.
For a district court to terminate its supervision in a situation
where the quality of education to African-American students is
not equal to that provided to Caucasian students clearly
165. Id. at 47.
166. Id.
167. David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1989).
168. Id. at 945.
169. Brown, supra note 51, at 6.
170. Id. at 66-69.
171. Id. at 48 (writing that "the state cannot rely on parents to fill its
interest in the proper inculcation of values, because the parents' influence will
often be what the state is attempting to counteract"). Brown also adds that "[t]o
accept that the continued racial imbalance is justified because of parental belief
about African-Americans, which may have also been a reflection of their
acceptance of the invidious value, is a continuation of the prior harm, rather
than a remedy for it." Id.
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means that invidious value inculcation continues to exist.
Unlike residential segregation, inequities in school quality are
completely under the control of the school district; therefore,
explanations that do not rest upon an assumption of AfricanAmerican inferiority will be difficult to make.1
Thus, even though a school district does not intend to segregate
students, the existence of state-sponsored unequal opportunities in
de facto segregated schools can deliver a stigmatic message.173
Moreover, in so far as the racial isolation in those schools is a
product of unfettered parental choices, students will understand
why their schools are segregated and unequal, which can produce
new and continuing stigmatic effects.
D.

FutureApplications of Stigma Theory

Although stigmatic harms have continually been at the core of
equal protection law, identifying these harms is fraught with
practical problems.
First, as scholars readily acknowledge, no
theory of stigma has provided much predictive power for future
cases. The culturally-contingent and amorphous nature of stigmatic
injuries has left their boundaries undefined.
Scholars have
proposed plausible tests to resolve the problem,17 but courts have
not concurred in the need to standardize stigma jurisprudence. As a
result, scholars charge that the Supreme Court's holdings have been
inconsistent with regard to stigma.' 7'
Second, subjective differences in the perception of stigma or,
worse, the conscious manipulation of stigma's undefined boundaries
are the root of the inconsistent results. If manipulation is the
explanation, stigma theory may suffer an inherent flaw that permits
some courts to construct rationales consistent with their own theory
of race rather than one grounded in objective facts.
Brian
Landsberg expands on this problem, writing: "Of late, some Justices
have increasingly reverted to references to stigma in race
discrimination cases; the term has become a double-edged sword.' 76
For instance, members of the Court have attempted to justify
continued court-ordered desegregative busing based on the need to

172. Id. at 39.
173. See id.; see also Donald E. Lively, Desegregation and the Supreme
Court: The FatalAttraction of Brown, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649, 675 (1993)
("To the extent stigmatization is a function of racial separation, no real
difference exists with respect to whether segregation is characterized as de jure
or de facto.").
174. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 52, at 324 (proposing a cultural meaning
test); Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 890-96 (proposing a structured analysis of
stigmatic harm).
175. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 876.
176. Brian K. Landsberg, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Rehnquist
Court Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821, 836 (1993).
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redress lingering stigmatic injuries of segregated schooling. 177
Conversely, other members argue that all race-conscious and
affirmative action programs, including those that are wellintentioned or have minimal tangible effects, must be subjected to
strict scrutiny because they pose stigmatic harm." 8 Justices Scalia
and Thomas go further, seeking to prohibit certain de jure
segregation remedies because they purportedly send a message of
black inferiority. 9 Thus, claims of stigmatic harm are just as easily
used to prevent integration efforts or race-based remedies as they
are to demand them. An appreciation of context would limit
manipulation of stigma theory, but a searching judicial review of
context is often lacking.
The third, related problem with stigma theory is that, in so far
as it reflects a race-conscious approach, it conflicts with the
dominant conservative ideology of colorblindness. Colorblindness
theory argues that race should be, and is, irrelevant.8 0 It does not
necessarily deny the existence of racial stigma, but suggests the only
option is to live with it for a period of time. Racial stigma is a direct
result of racial considerations and classifications. 8 ' Thus, stigma
will not be eliminated by making further uses of race, but rather by
112
ignoring race and removing it from decision-making processes.
Consequently, colorblindness holds that, regardless of context or
stigma, the only relevant criteria in making decisions in admissions,
employment, and
contracting, for instance, are those related to
183
individual merit.
Stigma theory, in contrast, may demand a race-conscious
remedy where colorblindness is inadequate. In fact, the Court's
mandatory desegregation jurisprudence demonstrates that racial
stigma can persist even when the government acts in a racially

177. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
178. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny to all uses of race by the federal government); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny even though no
tangible harm existed); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to all uses of race by state government).
179. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 761 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Landsberg, supra note 176,
at 823-24, 835-38 (discussing the issue of black inferiority in both segregation
and desegregation).
180. powell, supra note 29, at 892-93.
181. See generally id. at 892-97 (discussing colorblindness theory).
182. Id. at 897; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (arguing that "[tihe way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race").
183. See, e.g., Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and JudicialIncoherence,
55 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 95 (1994).
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neutral manner. 84 Thus, ignoring race simply allows historical
stigma to persist. Professor Brown makes the same point when he
asserts that the invidious value of de jure segregated schools will
continue to produce stigmatic harms until the invidious value is
countered.18

A colorblind approach cannot counteract these harms. At best,
colorblindness is a symbolic message itself, which over time might
slowly erode stigma or allow stigma simply to pass. But in the
meantime, colorblindness does not counter stigma because it ignores
it. For instance, focusing solely on individual characteristics, with
no appreciation of stigmatic harms that an individual might suffer,
advantages nonstigmatized individuals and disadvantages the
stigmatized. Even if the state is not responsible for the stigma, the
stigma still affects one's past performance and experience. On this
basis, stigma is a relevant criterion or factor, even in merit-based
decisions. Thus, only by recognizing stigma can the government
disassociate itself from its effects.
In sum, stigmatic harm and stigma theory can ultimately justify
or require voluntary desegregation plans. From the perspective of
the past stigmatic messages schools have sent, schools are bound to
respond with measures to eliminate stigma. As Brown emphasizes,
most have yet to do so. Similarly, schools' failure in this respect
directly contributes to the value-based choices that today's parents
make regarding schools. These choices often detrimentally affect
the educational opportunities of poor and minority students. Thus,
regardless of schools' past remedial efforts, they now have a
responsibility to take actions that disassociate themselves from the
effects of their past stigmatic messages. Otherwise, schools will
continue to fall prey to their own past actions. Moreover, even if one
assumes that stigma is not attributable to the schools themselves,
stigmatic effects are real and have consequences for children and
schools. Unless we are to wait decades for stigma to fade by indirect
measures, recognizing and responding to stigma is crucial to
delivering quality educational opportunities.
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE STIGMA OF PARENTS INVOLVED

The Court's opinion in Parents Involved is split. Four Justices
in the plurality found that race could not be used in any respect to
remedy de facto school segregation."' Justice Kennedy concurred in
184. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-11 (1973)
(concluding neutral explanations do not justify segregation and that the
remoteness in time of past discrimination does not eliminate the school's
obligation); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (rejecting a
neutral assignment plan because it did not eliminate the continuing vestiges of
discrimination).
185. Brown, supra note 51, at 66-69.
186. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
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the plurality's holding that these plans were unconstitutional, but
he did not join the rationale of their decision. Instead, he agreed
with the four dissenters that schools have a compelling interest in
diversity and in eliminating racial isolation." 7 He, however, broke
from the dissenters by finding that the desegregation plans in
Seattle and Louisville were unconstitutional because they were not
narrowly tailored.' 88 The plans relied too heavily on race and did not
exhaust race-neutral alternatives. 9 With no opinion garnering five
votes, Justice Kennedy's opinion is the controlling opinion in Parents
Involved.
The basic holding of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that, although
schools have a compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation and/or
achieving diversity, their use of race is restricted to two methods.
First, they can use race in a general way, through the site selection
of schools, redrawing of attendance zones, and other policies that do
not rely on individual classifications of students by race.' 9
Second, if race is to be used with regard to individual students,
it can only be one of several factors.' 9' Moreover, Kennedy sees this
use of race as being for the pursuit of diversity. Thus, the schools
need to make nuanced decisions analogous to those authorized in
Grutter v. Bollinger.'9' As Kennedy writes, in the context of primary
and secondary schools, "[r]ace
may be one component
of... diversity, but other demographic193 factors, plus special talents
and needs, should also be considered.'

A.

Justice Kennedy's Theory of Stigma
The wider significance of Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, is
the premise upon which it stands. His opinion is premised on the
theory that individual racial classifications necessarily stigmatize.

187. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
188. Id. at 2789-91.
189. Id. at 2789-90.
190. Id. at 2792. Justice Kennedy also stated that:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race.

Id.
191. Id. at 2793 ("[Tihe small number of assignments affected [by the use of
express racial classifications] suggests that the schools could have achieved
their stated ends through.. . a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school
needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component.").
192. Id. at 2792-93.
193. Id. at 2797.
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Consequently, his opinion struggles to reconcile the compelling
interests-the achievement of which may require the consideration
of race-with what he finds to be the inherent stigmatic harms of
using race. This tension produces a decision that, in some respects,
is at odds with itself. He recognizes compelling interests in
voluntary desegregation, but limits schools' ability to use race in
order to achieve it. Ultimately, those limiting aspects of his opinion
are a response to perceived stigmas.
Kennedy begins by lauding the efforts of schools "to teach that
our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and
cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all.' ' 94 As to this
broad principle, he reaffirms the holding in Grutter that diversity is
a compelling interest.1 95 He then suggests he is expanding Grutterto
recognize a compelling interest in reducing racial isolation in public
schools. 196 In fact, he briefly acknowledges that de facto segregation
197
threatens the well-being of public schools, and they must respond.
He, however, reveals no indication that he knows exactly what this
threat is or what causes it. He simply contemplates that "[t]he
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too
often it does.""9 " On this basis, he concedes that colorblindness
"cannot be a universal constitutional principle." 199
The remainder of his decision, however, expresses uneasiness
with the logical extension of these principles. He rhetorically rejects
staunch adherence to colorblindness 2 0 0 but his opinion's rationale is
driven by the concern that, in the absence of a colorblind approach,
individuals will be stigmatized. He writes, "[t]o make race matter
now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very
prejudices we seek to overcome., 20 '
In effect, stigmatic harm
becomes the double-edged sword described by Landsberg. °2 On the
one hand, Kennedy notes that "[flrom the standpoint of the victim,"
the stigmatic injury of de facto segregation may be no less than the
injury of de jure segregation.0 3 On the other hand, using racial
classifications to address segregation may simply replicate stigmatic

194. Id. at 2788.
195. Id. at 2789.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2791.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2791-92.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2788.
202. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
203. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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harms.204
Scholars and previous Supreme Court Justices have cautioned
that desegregation remedies implicitly premised on black inferiority
could produce new stigmatic harms, 20

but Kennedy's opinion is

unconcerned with this specific stigma. His opinion is premised on a
different notion of stigma. He equates the stigmatic harms of
voluntary desegregation with those of affirmation action programs.
His choice of language is telling on this point. He refers to racial
classifications in desegregation as racial preferences, which is the
prevalent characterization in affirmative action cases.0 7 Second, he
states that "[tihese plans classify individuals by race and allocate
benefits and burdens on that basis,"2 8 which again is characteristic
of affirmative action. Last, he explicitly draws the connection
between desegregation and competitive admissions or government
contracting awards, quoting prior Courts for the premise that "there
is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
20 9
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.

In these respects, he likens school desegregation to an affirmative
action plan with its attendant stigmatic harms.
Beyond these generalized assertions of stigma, Kennedy also
identifies a new stigmatic harm to individuality. Kennedy suggests
that, by mere virtue of classifying individuals by race, the
government stigmatizes them. Government need not prefer one race
over another or attach benefits to the classifications. Classifying
persons by race stigmatizes them by undermining the primary
relevance of their individuality.
Moreover, these particular
classifications go a step further by treating racial groups as fungible.
Kennedy repeatedly indicates that these classifications are
"crude" and inappropriately based on the binary categories of "white
and non-white." 210 Thus, not only are individuals racially classified,

they are classified inaccurately into catch-all groups that further
obfuscate their individuality. Such racial classifications, regardless
of preferences or benefits, present a "danger to individual freedom"
and "cause [a] hurt or anger of the type the Constitution
204. Id. at 2796-97.
205. See discussion supraParts ILA, II.B.
206. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
207. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 267 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995).
208. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
209. Id. at 2789 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989)).
210. Id. at 2790, 2792, 2797.
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prevents."2 11
Kennedy's most poignant explanation of the exact nature of
stigmatic harm to individuality comes at the end of his decision. He
writes:
To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society. And
it is a label that an individual is powerless to change.
Governmental classifications that command people to march in
different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse,
where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage
but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process. On
the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on
differential treatment based on individual classifications
present these problems to a lesser degree.
The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument
with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap
forward.... Under our Constitution the individual, child or
adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona,
without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his
race or the color of her skin.212
In essence, stigma flows from "crude measures" that "reduce
children to racial chits."213 It is not that one group is preferred over
another, but that to classify one by race is to necessarily assign some
value to race. Rather than being treated as individuals, students
become racial chits "traded according to one school's supply [of a
particular race] and another's demand. 2 14 Given this concern, he
concludes that individuals can be classified by race only as a last
resort.""
And
raceshoud
be even .1at that
1216point, he suggests factors in addition to
race should be considered.
Presumably, the consideration of other
factors protects individuality and reduces the likelihood of
stigmatization.
This concept of stigma explains why Justice Kennedy rejects
individual racial classifications, but has no concern over general
uses of race that do not classify individuals.217 In fact, he suggests
that the general consideration of race, such as in the drawing of
school district lines, would not even warrant strict scrutiny.218 The
implicit rationale is that a general use of race poses no threat to
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 2793.
Id. at 2797.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2792.
Id. at 2797.
Id. at 2792.
Id.
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individuality or of stigmatization. In short, the threat of individual
stigma is the dividing line between permissible and impermissible
uses of race. Moreover, stigma forms the core of his rationale
because no other theory of harm will support a holding in the
plaintiffs' favor.
B.

The Absence of MaterialHarm or Discrimination
Voluntary desegregation plans like those at issue in Seattle and
Louisville are conceptually similar to vote redistricting in that
neither involves a material harm. The consideration of race in
redistricting, for instance, does not deny anyone the right to vote or
entail vote dilution.2 9 Rather, the only harm is that of expressive or
stigmatic messages.22 ° Parents Involved poses the same problem.
Kennedy avoids this problem by blurring the distinction between
intangible stigmatic harms directed at racial groups and material
harms suffered by individuals. He articulates the stigmatic harm
as a threat to individuals.22 ' Combining the concepts, however, does
little to establish an individual material harm or a general stigmatic
racial harm. Racial stigma is, by its nature, a group concept. Thus,
race either stigmatizes a racial group or it does not. If the harm is
distinct to individuals, then it is not a racially stigmatic harm.
Nevertheless, the rationale for Parents Involved, like the voting
cases, ultimately rests on a theory of stigmatic harm because
properly constructed voluntary desegregation plans do not allocate
benefits or burdens. Kennedy matter-of-factly asserts
S
222that the plans
in Parents Involved do allocate benefits or burdens, but provides
no substantiation for his assertion. Moreover, the nature of public
schooling and the details of voluntary desegregation contradict him.
Every child in a school district is guaranteed a seat at one of the
public schools, but no child has an entitlement to attend a particular
school.22 ' The only entitlement is to attend a school. Granted, many
parents may expect their child to attend the school closest to their
home. And for political reasons, effective voluntary desegregation
plans may guarantee parents a neighborhood school" .2
But in the
absence of such a guarantee, students
have
no
choice
but to go
.1
225
where the school district assigns them.
Thus, as a general matter,
219. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 494.
220. Id. at 506-07.
221. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
222. Id. at 2789.
223. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(b) (2007).
224. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005).
225. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978).
See generally Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent
of School Choice, in

SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY,

AND LAw 13, 14-31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999)
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disgruntlements over school assignments do not give rise to a
constitutional harm.226
Even if the schools within a district are significantly unequal in
terms of facilities, curricula, and instructional quality, a parent's
appropriate claim would be for the schools to be equalized, not for
the district to change its assignment policies. Under federal law,
there is no immediate prohibition on school inequality so long as
discrimination based on race (or any other prohibited criteria) is not
the cause of the inequality. 227 Even if race is the cause, the harm
flows from allocating school resources in a discriminatory manner,
not from the neutral assignment process. Thus, a court would not
necessarily force a school to change its assignment process. The
choice of how to assign students is one reserved entirely to the
discretion of school districts. 228 The only limitation on that choice is
a prohibition against unconstitutional motivations such as the
intent to segregate students.229 In short, the remedy for unequal
schools is not to assign a student to the non-neighborhood school of
his choice, but to equalize his original school.
Effective voluntary desegregation plans, however, avoid this
issue entirely by creating a system of equal schools. When schools
are qualitatively equal, school assignments neither occasion a
burden, nor deny an educational benefit.
One might argue that
harm befalls a student or parent because attending one school is
more convenient, for instance, in terms of transportation. Such a
claim, however, is flawed because this type of harm is not
attributable to the school district. All the district owes students is
(noting that "[m]ost American children attend a public school to which they are
assigned, usually on the basis of where they live," but exploring the various
ways in which students have been permitted to exercise choice).
226. See, e.g., Michael Alison Chandler, Fairfax Parents Put Map to Test,
WASH. POST, July 30, 2008, at B1 (noting that a local court had rejected a
lawsuit by parents challenging the rezoning and assignment of their children).
227. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-35
(1973) (stating that education is not a fundamental right and holding that
relying on property taxes to fund schools does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, even if doing so creates inequalities). The above the line statement
should not be taken to suggest that state law would permit this inequality. In
fact, in many instances state law would prohibit this inequality. See generally
Rebell, supra note 24, at 1500-05 (discussing the outcomes in state-based
inequality litigation).
228. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366(b) (2007) (assigning full and final
authority to school districts in the assignment of students).
229. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207-09 (1973) (prohibiting
intentional segregation in the assignment of students).
230. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 860
(W.D. Ky. 2004). For a further discussion of this point, see Brief for Pamela
Freeman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-22, Comfort v. Lynn
Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-2415), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=74 (arguing that on this basis
strict scrutiny did not even apply).
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an equal education. The district is not obliged to provide it in a
particular location. That obtaining education requires a student to
travel to a specific location is not to occasion a harm, but merely a
natural incident of receiving the benefit. In fact, some school
districts
offer no bus transportation at all, or limit it to certain
S
231
students.
Some inconveniences can rise to a level that effectively
bars a student from obtaining an education, but short of that, such
inconveniences do not create harms attributable to the school.
Moreover, real though an inconvenience might be, the Constitution
does not deal in trivialities. A plaintiff must establish a concrete
harm attributable to the government.2 32
A concrete harm might occur if a district extended the absolute
right to choose a school to parents and then denied some parents
that right. Even then, equal protection would only prohibit denials
based on race or some other illegitimate consideration. Those who
assert that voluntary desegregation plans deny choice based on race
fail to distinguish between a denial of absolute choice based on race
and an assignment
parental preferences, individual
race schol
an that factors in
i.233
race, and school demographics.
Successful voluntary
desegregation plans never deny parents a choice while affording it to
others based on race.
First, the only absolute choice that voluntary desegregation
plans have offered parents is the choice to attend their neighborhood
school, as in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee.234 No evidence has
ever indicated that any parent, regardless of race, has been denied
this right once it has been extended.
Second, voluntarily
desegregating districts have not actually given parents the right to
choose any school beyond their neighborhood school. If a parent
declines the neighborhood school, the more accurate statement is
that parents are asked to list or rank their preferences among nonneighborhood schools.232 Allowing parents to rank or list schools
rather than choose a school changes the very nature of the interest
at stake. At most, the right is to rank schools and then be assigned
to one of the listed schools, not to choose one's school. The final
decision of which of a parent's preferred schools his child will attend
belongs to the district, which assigns students based on several
variables, one of which is race. 236 There is no indication, however,
231. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-188 (West 2005) (indicating that school
transportation is not required).
232, See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 62-63 (3d ed. 2006) (detailing the need for concrete harm).

233. Compare Memorandum of Facts and Law in Support of the Plaintiff at
2-4, McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky.
2004) (No. 3:02CV-620-H), 2004 WL 3951881, with McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d
at 842-44.
234. 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005).
235. See, e.g., McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 842-44.
236. Id. at 842.
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that any parent has ever been denied the right to rank or list schools
and be assigned to one of them, based on race or otherwise. In fact,
the evidence in reported cases indicates that the districts have
assigned all students to one of their top preferred schools. 237 In
short, plaintiffs may claim they have been denied their choice of a
non-neighborhood school based on race,238 but schools have never
extended such a right to parents. The rights they have extended-to
a neighborhood school, or to express preferences and have them
honored-have never been denied.
The notion of constitutional harm in voluntary desegregation is
even less plausible when one considers that districts could assign
students based on geography, special needs, socioeconomic status,
race (so long as it is not the predominant factor), and/or other
factors without even inquiring into parental preferences. Adding
parental preference as a consideration in this assignment process
does not transform the process from one of entire school discretion to
one in which students suffer constitutional harm when their
preferences are not given conclusive weight. Likewise, districts
wishing to create racially equitable schools need not eliminate the
valid consideration of race simply because they find it wise to elicit
parental preferences, respect them, and create popular assignment
processes.
Even if the interests at stake for students were tangible, it is
not clear that voluntary desegregation plans "discriminate" in the
traditional sense of denying opportunities based on membership in a
disfavored racial group. This traditional discrimination makes race
a crediting or discrediting factor because a differential value is
assigned to particular racial groups.
However, voluntary
desegregation does not use race in a way that favors any racial
group. All groups are valued equally.
First, the districts pay close attention to race to ensure that all
schools are racially integrated, but no group is systematically
favored or disfavored. Voluntary desegregation "prefers" multiracial
schools, not individual racial groups. Moreover, the extent to which
race will even play a role in any given assignment varies depending
on the existing racial makeup of a school, the number of students
seeking assignment, the number of available seats, the number of
students who have siblings at the school, etc. In many instances,
the circumstances are such that an individual's race is entirely
irrelevant in his assignment, 2 3 9

but even when race becomes

relevant, it does not advantage or disadvantage any racial group as
a whole. Rather, it is merely a factor in the assignment of some
237. Id. at 845 ("[Albout 95-96% of all elementary students receive their
first or second choice cluster school.").
238. See Memorandum of Facts and Law in Support of the Plaintiff, supra
note 233, at 3.
239. See McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
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members of some racial groups at some schools.
Second, because these plans do not assign students based on
merit or individual characteristics, it is inaccurate to say that
schools discriminate against students based on race.
Because
individual characteristics and merit are irrelevant in the school
assignments, there are no relevant criteria that the school ignores,
nor is there the elevation of one deserving student over another
undeserving student. All students are subjected to the same
assignment practices in the same respect; none have their race or
individual characteristics considered any differently than other
students. Thus, race is not used to disadvantage or "discriminate."
Third and similarly, these plans do not involve competition.
Competition entails situations where individuals can control or
improve their standing through performance or merit.
But
voluntary desegregation assigns students based on noncompetitive
criteria. In fact, suggesting that the students are in competition is
absurd when one considers the case of kindergartners. How could
one five-year-old child be said to be more worthy of assignment to a
particular elementary school than another student? One might
argue they are in competition in the sense of a lottery, but even
lotteries are not competitions. They may entail winners and losers,
but they are not based on skill or worth. Moreover, a lottery analogy
is inapplicable because voluntary desegregation plans do not have
any losers. The assignment process is not a zero-sum game. All
students are assigned to roughly equal schools.24 °
The point of the foregoing is that, once a system moves beyond
individualized decisions to group-based decisions that do not assign
benefits, the notion that the government is discriminating against
someone based on race is not accurate. Goodwin Liu's distinction
between merit-based selection decisions and vote redistricting
sorting decisions captures this point best. Liu reasons that equal
protection demands that the government treat its citizens as
individuals rather than components of racial groups, "[b]ut the
consequences of this principle ... differ from one context to
another."24 '
For instance, "[i]n university admissions, the
requirement that government 'treat citizens as individuals' forbids
the deterministic use of race for any applicant because the selection
process is understood to convey individual judgments about each
applicant's merits."242 But in sorting processes, such as assigning
localities to a voting district, "there is no suggestion that

240. The only difference is that some are assigned to the schools they
happened to prefer the most, but all are assigned to schools for which they
express a preference. Brief for Respondents at 8, Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
2944684.
241. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 311 (2007).
242. Id.
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government must 'treat citizens as individuals' in an equally strict
sense" because "the use of race in sorting does not present the same
hazards as the use of race in selection."24 3 The only hazard in
sorting is that race might become the predominant factor in the
overall decision, which otherwise would have been balanced against
additional relevant factors. In short, "the Court evaluates [sorting
processes] at the wholesale (aggregate) not retail (individual) level
in determining
whether government has treated citizens as
2 44
individuals.

Liu categorizes student assignment in voluntary desegregation
plans as a "sorting process" akin to redistricting, not a selection
process akin to university admissions. In essence, a school district
has to assign students to some school, and since both the students
and schools are equal, the school simply sorts students into different
schools. This is in contrast to a process where a school selects
students based on merit and other individual criteria and entirely
denies many students of any educational opportunity. The only
extent to which a sorting process might discriminate is in creating
an expressive harm that flows from the subordination of other
important values to race. This harm, however, is one to society or
racial groups in general.245 It is not discrimination against an
individual, or the denial of a benefit to a particular person.
In sum, voluntary desegregation plans do not materially harm
students. The plans may pose a constitutional harm' but that harm
is not material. At most, the harm is an expressive or stigmatic one
that might flow from the predominant consideration of race, the
preferencing of one racial group over another, or actions based on
racial stereotypes. Thus, the most applicable legal analysis is that
used in vote redistricting cases. But unlike vote redistricting, one
could argue that race might be the predominant factor without
creating an expressive or stigmatic harm because, as the following
sections demonstrate, the messages that voluntary desegregation
send are distinct and not based on racial politics or stereotypes.
C.

EvaluatingStigma in Voluntary Desegregation
To the extent that any harm flows from the sorting process of
voluntary desegregation, that harm must be stigmatic or expressive.
Kennedy makes passing reference to a material harm, but his
opinion consistently conceptualizes the harm as being a stigmatic
harm to the individual and potentially a general expressive harm.4
The flaw in Kennedy's opinion is not that he explores stigmatic
harms, but that he assumes their existence.
Using racial
classifications to achieve voluntary school desegregation is a far
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
See generally Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 507-09.
See supra notes 194-218 and accompanying text.
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different context, if not a unique one, from the classifications in all
other cases that have come before the Court. Moreover, accounting
for context is necessary for any assessment of stigma; thus, it cannot
be assumed here.
In fact, the following will show that stigma does
not flow from these classifications. The only way Kennedy finds
stigma is to assume that racial classifications inherently produce a
stigmatic harm. In essence, persons are stigmatized by mere virtue
of being classified by race, regardless of the results or conditions
attached to the classification. This position may have appeal in
theory, but a practical examination of voluntary desegregation fails
to unearth a stigma and, thus, proves that the theory simply does
not hold true.
1. Black Inferiority
Both Supreme Court Justices and scholars have asserted that
desegregation, even when a remedy for de jure segregation, can
stigmatize minorities.2 4 8

They conclude that the general skepticism

toward and rejection of all-black schools is premised on a notion of
black inferiority.2 9 The skepticism conveys the message that allblack schools are inherently problematic and that the presence of
white children is required for a quality education. Professor Brown
further argues that courts have perceived segregation as retarding
the development of blacks, thus rendering them in need of special
aid to overcome this retardation.25 ° The remedial focus on blacks
ignores the fact that segregation also harmed whites.
In short,
desegregation remedies may assume that blacks have, in fact, been
made inferior while whites have been unaffected.
One could query whether mandatory desegregation rested on
these notions, but voluntary desegregation plans do not. First,
voluntary
plans do not prohibit one-race or
imbaance desegregation
1 1252
imbalanced schools. Voluntary desegregation plans certainly hope
that one-race or racially imbalanced schools will be eliminated, but
they do not mandate it. To the extent they are eliminated, it is a
function of parents' voluntary preferences. In short, integrated
schools are a preference, not an absolute. This more flexible
approach helps avoid any potential message of black inferiority.
Second, the preference is for the elimination of both
247. Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 848.
248. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 761 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brown, supra note 51, at 68.
249. See Brown, supra note 51, at 48.
250. Id. at 56-57.
251. Id. at 56.
252. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005)
(indicating six schools were still racially imbalanced under the plan);
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 863 n.51 (W.D.
Ky. 2004) (noting a school that was outside the guidelines).
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predominantly white and predominantly minority schools. 53
Professor Brown's concern with messages of black inferiority arose
out of courts' single-minded objection to all-black schools. Voluntary
desegregation plans, however, recognize that all-white schools can
be as problematic as all-black schools. For instance, all-white
schools can result from parents choosing to send their kids solely to
such schools because they associate whiteness with superiority,
which is just as pernicious as associating blackness with
inferiority.254 Consequently, voluntary desegregation plans seek to
eliminate all one-race schools.
Third, even if all-black schools were the primary concern of a
school district, the reason for that concern separates it from a
message of black inferiority. Although Professor Brown has been
vigilant in identifying messages of black inferiority, he still
recognizes that when all-black schools are coupled with material
deprivation they pose educational harm.255
Recognizing this
educational harm is not to assume black inferiority, but to recognize
the material harm of inequity and the stigmatic harm that occurs
when inequity is coupled with race.
The goal of voluntary
desegregation plans is not to eliminate black schools per se, but
rather to eliminate the inequity that continues to follow them.256
Unlike "black" schools, racially isolated "white" schools generally
have not faced the same difficulty in gaining access to quality
teachers, good facilities, and other resources.5 7 Thus, a school
system whose goal is equitable access to resources could conceivably
focus on desegregating black schools without fostering notions of
black inferiority, because black schools are primarily the ones that
face barriers in that area. However, this desegregation would still
necessitate eliminating at least some white schools as well.
Fourth, voluntary desegregation is actually a response to,
rather than a cause of, racial stigma. Some might rush to assume
that the assertion that all-black schools generally do not provide
equal access to resources is a suggestion of black inferiority. The
assertion, however, is not based on a normative bias against black
schools, but rather on the fact that private racial biases cause
individuals to avoid black schools. Thus, to the extent the statement
raises a message of racial inferiority, the message is not attributable
to school officials or policy. Rather, the officials are reacting to that
message and attempting to counteract it. In short, preventing a
stigmatic message is different than sending one.
253. See, e.g., McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (indicating that no school
could be entirely white either, and requiring at least fifteen percent black
enrollment).
254. See Brown, supra note 51, at 47-48, 66.
255. Id. at 37-39.
256. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
257. See generally STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 10-15
(discussing the problems posed by resegregatation).
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Finally, as Lenhardt points out, minorities already encounter
racial stigma independent of governmental action.
Thus, the
relevant question is whether the government's action "exacerbate[s]
the [existing] baseline stigma. '5 8 Voluntary desegregation poses the
same question because, in the absence of desegregation, minorities
already encounter significant stigma and their schools are
abandoned as a result. No credible argument, however, exists that
by integrating black schools, blacks suffer stigmatic harms beyond
those posed by a system that offers unrestrained parental choice and
results in near complete segregation.
2.

Whites as Racial Perpetrators

Although not previously explored explicitly, one might argue
that whites as a group could be stigmatized by a voluntary
desegregation plan. Plans premised on the need to respond to racial
bias-primarily that of white parents and teachers-could send the
message that the white community is the perpetrator of a racial
harm.
As Alan Freeman concludes, the identification of a
perpetrator has been central to the Court's antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.
In the absence of an intentional perpetrator, racial
harms are of no constitutional concern. 26' For the most part, state
actors are only required to remedy racial harms that result from
intentional discrimination.2 6 '
By voluntarily desegregating, one
could argue that a school is effectively saying that white
perpetrators are harming minorities and the school must remedy
it. 62 Of course, not all whites are acting on racial biases, but such a
message could stigmatize whites by suggesting that they all hold
and act upon racially biased attitudes.
The concern over such a message has powerful undercurrents.
Being labeled a racist has significant social effects today. Although
racism has not been eliminated in our society, its explicit expression
largely has.6 Mainstream society no longer condones facially racist
258. Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 911.
259. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
260. Id. at 1118.
261. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007) (arguing that the pursuit of a remedy for intentional
discrimination is one of only two compelling interests to justify racial
integration); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing race-conscious measures must be confined to remedies for
intentional discrimination); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that nonremedial interests are not compelling and do not justify
affirmative action).
262. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 635-36 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that FCC affirmative action
program harmed white nonbeneficiaries and implicitly labeled them racists).
263. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW xix-xxii, 1 (5th ed.
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messages. Thus, one can easily imagine some defendants going to
trial rather than accepting otherwise beneficial settlements in race
discrimination cases simply because they wish to protect their
image.
Vindicating themselves as nonracist might be more
important than the financial costs. Concern with labeling or
stigmatizing white defendants may also explain the more stringent
liability tests that courts have adopted over the years and their
reluctance to impose liability even under the applicable standards.2 64
Regardless of whether these concerns are warranted, voluntary
desegregation plans are unlikely to inappropriately stigmatize
whites. The plans racially balance the schools, provide parents with
the opportunity to choose integrated schools, and remove the ability
to choose racially isolated white schools.26 5 By doing so, they give
whites the ability to distance themselves from the notion that they
are a "perpetrator" when they voluntarily select integrated schools.
Even those who might otherwise fall into the category of
"perpetrator" are shielded because they cannot act upon their bias so
long as they retain their child in the school system. In effect, their
bias is hidden. Ultimately, the only stigmatic effect that might
befall whites is one subjectively perceived based on personal
ideology or biases. But the only legally relevant stigmas are
objective ones based on collective cultural meaning. 66
Moreover, even if one assumed some minor stigmatization to
whites, it alone would be an insufficient basis upon which to
invalidate these plans. White bias in school selection exists as a
verifiable fact and produces deleterious results.267
To allow
2004); Tristen K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

91, 91-96 (2003) (discussing the shift in the nature of discrimination from
conscious animus to unconscious bias); Lawrence, supra note 52, at 321-24
(finding that most discrimination is subconscious); see also Michael Selmi,
Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86

GEO. L.J. 279, 335 (1997) (discussing the Court's difficulty in shifting from a
"segregation mentality").
264. See Freeman, supra note 259, at 1055 (indicating that the intent
standard creates a class of "innocents" who have no responsibility for their
actions); see also NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1047-48 (6th
Cir. 1977) (discussing the impossibility of finding liability under the current
intent standard); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151
(1991) (detailing empirical findings that show a pattern of courts failing to infer
discrimination); Selmi, supra note 263, at 293 (finding the "standard of proof
probably cannot be met" in some intent cases); Strauss, supra note 167, at 96568, 990-91.
265. See supra Part I.B.

266. See Lawrence, supra note 52, at 321-28; Lenhardt, supra note 95, at
809-11.
267. See ERICA FRANKEBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, CHARTER ScHooLs AND RACE:
A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR INTEGRATED EDUCATION 5, 8 (2003), available at

http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Charter Schools03.pdf
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stigmatic effects to prevent schools from remedying and separating
themselves from racial bias would be to undermine the principles of
antidiscrimination entirely.
Any time the state remedies
discrimination or bias, it potentially stigmatizes whites. But there
is nothing inappropriate about stigmatizing those who actually act
upon racial bias, and the indirect effect on innocent parties 1"has
268
never prevented courts from remedying demonstrated racial bias.
The need to remedy demonstrated harms outweighs incidental or
minor effects.
3.

Individuality

Classifying persons by race also could, in some instances, have
stigmatic effects on individuals.
For instance, classifying
individuals by race and treating their race as more important than
other individual characteristics that would otherwise be relevant to
a decision-making process might stigmatize individuals. The harm
results from classifications that suggest individuality is irrelevant
and that a person's only value stems from membership in a racial
group. This type of stigmatic harm to individuality is at the
forefront of quota prohibitions and individualized review
requirements in selective admission processes. 269
Voluntary desegregation does not stigmatize individuals by
ignoring otherwise relevant personal characteristics because there
are no relevant individual characteristics to disregard. These plans
do not assess individual merit, nor do they involve competitive
selection procedures. Thus, minorities are not harmed by the notion
that their admission is based on race, nor are whites or members of
any other group labeled as unmeritorious when they are assigned to
their second-preferred school.
No one operates under the
assumption that anyone "earns" a seat at a particular school, or that
anyone is at a school even though they did not earn it. Ultimately,
everyone is at a school for the same reason: they expressed a
preference for it and there was room. The only question is whether
a school was a student's first or second choice. Moreover, even on
that point, no one would assume that one racial group always gets

(discussing how parental choice has led to the high levels of racial isolation in
charter schools); Jeffrey R. Hennig, School Choice Outcomes, in SCHOOL CHOICE
AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAw 68, 90-97 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (discussing the effect of selection
bias on schools).
268. By analogy, one of the major functions of criminal law is to stigmatize
certain conduct or express a social rejection of it. See generally Joel Feinberg,
The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia
Fisher, Overcoming ProceduralBoundaries,94 VA. L. REV. 79, 93-94 (2008).
269. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 14-15 (1979)
(discussing the issue of stigma in regard to quotas versus the Harvard plan).
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its first choice while others do not. As discussed earlier, race does
not even play a role in the overwhelming majority of assignments,
but when it does, it is circumstantial, affecting different persons,
different racial groups, and different schools in each instance.
Kennedy's suggestion that the Seattle and Louisville school
districts could cure the constitutional deficiencies in their plans by
incorporating other "demographic factors, plus special talents and
needs" misses the point.2 7 0 A voluntary desegregation plan whose
purpose is to eliminate racial isolation and the inequitable
educational opportunities that accompany it is not equivalent to
pursuing diversity. Equity plans do not "select" students based on
diversity or merit criteria.
Thus, equity plans do not
inappropriately exclude any relevant factor when they rely heavily
on race, but not other individual characteristics. Kennedy's opinion,
however, fails to distinguish between equity and diversity plans,
almost exclusively conceptualizing voluntary desegregation as a
pursuit of diversity.27 1 Desegregation plans, as a practical matter,
will result in greater diversity, but that schools welcome this
incidental result does not entail that they are pursuing diversity as
a primary end and, thus, are subject to admissions-style
requirements.
Kennedy's general skepticism toward the Seattle and Louisville
plans undermines his ability to appreciate the distinction between
equity and diversity plans. He posits that "one can ... identify a
construction of Jefferson County's student assignment plan that, at
least as a logical matter, complies with" the Constitution,272 but he
then faults the schools for not explaining exactly how race operates
under these plans.273 Louisville, for instance, stated its voluntary
desegregation plan involves a "complex, comprehensive plan that
contains multiple strategies for achieving racially integrated
schools," and that "[t]here are no selection criteria for admission to
[an elementary school student's] resides school, except attainment of
the appropriate age and completion of the previous grade."274 But
Kennedy characterizes the complexities as "ambiguities." 75
In
effect, he suggests that there is a veil behind which inappropriate
decisions are occurring, such as haphazard assignments by race,
when the plan actually operates just as the schools indicate. The
270. See Black, supra note 32, at 965.
271. Id. at 966-67 (analyzing Kennedy's confusion over the purposes and
nature of the plans).
272. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2790 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 5, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
2944684).
275. Id.
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complexity should not signal obfuscation, but the fact that race only
operates in limited, specific instances based on parental preferences
and multiple other nonindividual factors. Moreover, the school is
not trying to pass a multi-factor process off as a diversity inquiry,
although Justice Kennedy may mistake it for as much.
Consequently, he forces a sorting process into a selection process
analysis.
In the end, however, this is to assume that a
desegregation plan is something it is not. So long as it does not
pursue diversity or evaluate individuality, it cannot stigmatize by
disregarding individuality.
Kennedy, however, also raises a different concern with regard to
individuality: that individuals are stigmatized merely by virtue of
recognizing their race. The notion is that, by recognizing race, the
government makes an irrelevant factor relevant to an individual's
identity. This notion is at the core of colorblindness theory, which
argues that only by ignoring race and making it irrelevant can we
eliminate racial stigma.276
Otherwise, we just perpetuate it.
Extensive scholarship explores colorblindness's efficacy or naivet6 in
producing racial justice,277 but that scholarship is unnecessary to
resolve the narrower question of whether the mere recognition or
classification by race, with no adverse consequences attached to it,
stigmatizes individuals. A simple review of context and precedent
reveals that racial classifications do not inherently stigmatize
individuals.
As an initial matter, Kennedy himself notes the allure of
colorblindness,
but concludes it cannot be a universal constitutional
• •
278
principle.
Second, nothing about stigma is natural or inherent.
Context always matters because stigma is a social construct that
results from shared cultural meaning and expectations,279 which are
subject to change. Thus, negative cultural meaning does not
automatically attach to racial classifications. In fact, individuals are
regularly classified by race with no effect. For instance, the
collection of census data by race has no stigmatic effect.28 ° Merely
asking people to indicate their race and compiling data along with it
does not send a negative or positive message about race. So long as
the racial categories do not include derogatory or inaccurate
categories, the process is neutral.
The Supreme Court's own jurisprudence also confirms this
276. See powell, supra note 29, at 892.
277. See, e.g., id. at 892-97.
278. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
279. Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 822; Lpez, supra note 12, at 27-28.
280. No court has ever prohibited the collection of this data. Some advocacy
groups, however, have objected to the collection of data by race, arguing that it
only facilitates our continued infatuation with race and inappropriate racebased actions. Thus far, this argument has only found an audience in
California. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (amended 1996) (further clarified by CAL.
GoVT CODE § 8315 (West 2008)).
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point. Most notably, Shaw v. Reno and Grutter v. Bollinger reject
the notion that racial recognition or classification alone stigmatizes
individuals.
Shaw recognized the appropriateness of racial
considerations in vote redistricting, and Grutter recognized the
importance of racial classifications as a component of diversity in
competitive admissions.28 ' In both cases, the Court only deemed
racial classifications as stigmatizing individuals when they are used
282
to the exclusion of other important values and considerations.
Thus, these cases demonstrate that racial classifications are not per
se stigmatic.
Whether racial classifications cross the line and become stigma
depends on context. In voting, racial considerations cross the line
when they subordinate traditional redistricting criteria, such as
2813
compactness, and consequently produce bizarrely shaped districts.
In admissions, racial considerations cross the line if other diversity
factors are not also considered or if they substitute for merit
factors.284 In short, racial classifications only stigmatize when
combined with a specific context. Thus, Kennedy's notion that racial
classifications themselves stigmatize is misguided. Instead, he must
attach the classifications to a context that reveals a stigmatizing
effect.
Had Kennedy attempted to identify stigma in context, he would
have found it does not exist in voluntary desegregation. Although
stigmatic messages can accompany desegregation, those messages
do not flow from appropriately constructed voluntary desegregation
plans. These plans are carefully tailored to avoid stigma in various
ways discussed throughout this Article.285
Most notably, they
express no preference for any racial group.8 6 Rather, the preference
is for multi-racial schools, which operates to limit both all-white and
all-black schools. 287 Thus, the notion that stigma inherently follows
racial classifications cannot be supported by context. And as only
context can explain cultural meaning and stigma, the supposition
that voluntary desegregation stigmatizes is a reflection of an
ideology, such as colorblindness, rather than reality.
4.

Stigmatic Labeling

The particular categories or labels by which racial groups are
classified can also stigmatize. For instance, African-Americans were
281. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 642 (1993).
282. Grutter,539 U.S. at 328; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 640-49.
283. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 685.
284. Grutter,539 U.S. at 334.
285. See generally Epperson, supra note 37.
286. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing
that a school can be imbalanced by having too many or too few white or black
students).
287. Id.
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previously referred to as "colored" or "negro" and by means of other
terms."' The whole point of these racial labels was to draw upon
negative cultural associations and stigmatize individuals. This sort
of stigmatic harm, however, can be effected by more subtle means,
such as failing to recognize an individual's ethnicity or
Thus, lumping all Koreans,
overgeneralizing based on race.
Japanese, Chinese, and other Asian nationalities into the catch-all
category of "Asian" might stigmatize by suggesting these groups are
monolithic rather than distinct cultures. Although he does not
explicitly state it, these sorts of stigmatic harms are part of what
concern Justice Kennedy in regard to what he calls "crude" racial
S •

289

categories .

On this point, Justice Kennedy raises a valid concern about the
particular racial categories used in Seattle and Louisville. Justice
Kennedy notes that the districts classified students as white and
nonwhite, categories he characterizes as "crude" on several
This point correctly recognizes that racial
occasions.29 °
classifications that lump everyone into binary racial groups can send
negative messages. For instance, grouping students into white and
nonwhite categories could suggest that whiteness is the standard by
which all groups are measured, further implying that whites have
an elevated value and minorities a diminished one. 291 This grouping
also oversimplifies racial diversity and conveys the message that
there are only two relevant racial groups, a presumption that
disregards the ethnic identity and uniqueness of everyone who is not
white.
The only potential responses to these charges would be that the
district initially classifies students into several distinct racial
categories consistent with students' own racial identification, and
the white and nonwhite labels are only used as part of a second level
of data calculation and comparison consistent with previous courtordered desegregation.292 Notwithstanding this distinction, binary
categories may still stigmatize. The stigma, however, may be a
preexisting one. Racial bias regularly manifests itself through a
288. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (referring to AfricanAmericans as "[niegroes"); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (referring
to African-Americans as "colored").
289. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2792-97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
290. Id. at 2790-92, 2797.
291. By analogy, Professor Brown argues that desegregation remedies that
rely on the presence of white students in black schools as the measure of school
quality promote a notion of black inferiority. See Brown, supra note 51, at 52-

53, 60, 65, 67-68.
292. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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white/nonwhite framework. For instance, white and/or affluent
families generally will not choose to live in neighborhoods or send
their children to schools where a significant proportion of persons
are people of color. 93 That no single racial minority group is a
majority is irrelevant.2 94 For that reason, when dealing with
mandatory desegregation, district courts have regularly combined
the percentages of Latinos and Blacks in a school and compared that
percentage against whites to assess integration. 5 Based on these
experiences, the binary racial categorizations employed by the
Seattle and Louisville school districts may have been rational. One
might argue that the only necessary limitation on the use of such
categories would be that they not stigmatize individuals beyond the
preexisting stigma attributable to private actors.
Regardless, eliminating stigmatic labels would have little
practical effect on voluntary desegregation plans' overall efficacy.
Racial classifications themselves do not inherently stigmatize;
rather, only crude binary ones do. Therefore, the remedy would
simply be to avoid these specific crude categories, not racial
categories in general. A school can easily do this by using accurate
and distinct racial categories. Thus, to the extent that Justice
Kennedy's point about stigma is accurate, it is a minor one. In
contrast, his larger points are misguided because voluntary
desegregation plans overall do not threaten individualism or
stigmatize racial groups.
5. Stereotyping
Racial classifications have also traditionally raised concerns
about stereotyping. Racial classifications based on or motivated by
stereotypes stigmatize both individuals and groups. The stereotype,
however, need not be inherently derogatory to stigmatize.
Stereotypes can cause stigmatic harm by simply suggesting that all
persons of a racial group act or think the same way. Derogatory
stereotypes can deprive individuals of opportunities and oppress,
but nonderogatory stereotypes can also harm individuals by
293. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., The Space Between School Desegregation
Court Orders and Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1721, 1745-46 (2004) (discussing white flight from schools that had
become predominantly African-American). See generally KOZOL, supra note 48,
at 49-51.
294. KOZOL, supra note 48, at 22.
295. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp 214, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (comparing Latino and African-American test results to those of
whites and Asians); see also Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283
F. Supp. 2d 328, 379-80 (D. Mass. 2003) (explaining why a desegregation plan
that classified students as either white or nonwhite was appropriate in the city
of Lynn).
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overgeneralizing and undermining their individuality.
Reliance on stereotypes and overgeneralization were at the root
of the problem in the Court's vote redistricting cases.296 In those
cases, the Court objected to the consideration of race as a
predominant factor in drawing districts because it was premised on
the notion that all members of a racial group think and vote alike.297
Similarly, in the educational context, the Court has been concerned
that educators are equating race with some stereotypical trait. For
instance, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the

university asserted that it reserved seats at the medical school for
minorities to increase the number of doctors working in underserved
communities. The Court responded that no evidence bore out that
correlation.298 Rather, the assertion was based on a stereotypical or
generalized notion of minorities' backgrounds and where they would
want to work.299 If the university's goal was to increase the presence
of doctors in underserved communities, the appropriate practice
would be to screen applicants for the actual characteristics and
interests that lead doctors to work in underserved communities.
Diversity rationales can raise similar issues in competitive
admissions programs. Schools pursue diverse student bodies to
ensure robust
,• 301classroom discussion and the exploration of multiple
perspectives.
Courts, however, caution that a diversity program
that only considers race engages in the same type of stereotyping as
that involved in the vote redistricting cases. 30 1 By limiting diversity
to race, a school assumes that members of a racial group have a
particular and distinct perspective or experience. 23 " Race, without
question, significantly affects an individual's life experience, but this
296. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
297. Vera, 517 U.S. at 958-59, 968-71; Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-20, 927;
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647-48, 653.
298. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978).
299. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1974).

300. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); Smith v. Univ. of
Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 377 (9th Cir. 2004).
301. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (rejecting the premise that "genuine
diversity" can be attained simply by pursuing "ethnic diversity"); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a school's exclusive
focus on racial/ethnic diversity in its admissions policy amounted to nothing
less than racial balancing); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
619-20 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plan was premised on
the stereotype that "[i]ndividuals of unfavored racial and ethnic backgrounds
are unlikely to possess the unique experiences and background that contribute
to viewpoint diversity").
302. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 619-20; Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1373-74 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
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experience is not monolithic and does not necessarily distinguish
one's perspective from that of others. Thus, courts have allowed
schools to pursue diversity, but it must be real diversity. 3 rather
than a pretext for minority admissions. Real diversity entails a
consideration
of factors beyond race that affect an individual's
1 04
perspective.
Voluntary desegregation plans premised on equity, however, do
not pose a risk of stereotyping. Racial classifications only stereotype
when some substantive meaning is attached to race. Although
racial integration plans premised on achieving the educational
benefits of diversity may rest on stereotypical notions, desegregation
plans premised on providing equitable opportunities do not. Equity
plans do not bring students of different racial groups together so
that they might share their purportedly distinct perspectives.
Equity plans bring students together so that they can prevent
racially segregated schools that result in racially unequal
opportunities.
The districts must create schools that "look"
equitable so that they can keep them equal in fact.
Given that desegregation brings groups together that otherwise
are separated, it may also help achieve the educational benefits of
diversity. But those benefits, although valuable, are incidental;
thus, they are not premised on stereotypes. With that said, it is
worth emphasizing that, to the extent students themselves hold
racial stereotypes, integrated schools in particular can remediate
those stereotypes.0 0 A school pursuing this end would not be acting
upon or furthering stereotypes. In short, any assumption that
voluntary desegregation plans stereotype racial groups simply
confuses desegregation with diversity, or mistakes a school's
motivations when it welcomes the incidental educational benefits of
diversity that often accompany desegregation.
6. Racial Politics
The last stigmatic concern that Justice Kennedy raises is that
using racial classifications to achieve desegregation might "reduce
children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school's
supply and another's demand."306
This concern relates, as noted earlier, to individuality, but it
also speaks to the Court's long-held concern that affirmative action
303. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (requiring consideration of "all pertinent
elements of diversity").
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., id. at 319-20, 330.
306. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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plans use race to30 further
a political agenda, or what the Court calls
7
"racial politics."

Racial politics can divide individuals

into

competing racial groups.0 8 Kennedy specifically points to this
possibility in Parents Involved, writing that schools' race
consciousness may "lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves
not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a
bargaining chip in the political process."3 9
Racial categories can, without question, serve these ends, but to
assume that voluntary desegregation promotes racial politics is to
overgeneralize.
Just as racial categories do not inherently
undermine individuality or stigmatize, the use of race to make
decisions does not inherently involve racial politics. As a general
matter, racial politics involves at least two characteristics:
favoritism toward a racial group or groups and a zero-sum game
that allows the favoritism to advantage one group and disadvantage
another.310
Both of these characteristics are missing from voluntary
desegregation. First, as discussed throughout this Article, voluntary
desegregation is not based on a preference for any particular racial
group.
Producing schools that are racially unidentifiable, by
necessity, will require the use of race, but there is no preferential or
detrimental treatment to any race as a group, or across schools. In
short, voluntary desegregation is free from charges of political
favoritism because it does not use race to benefit one group and not
another.
Second, voluntary desegregation avoids racial politics by
ensuring that all students receive an equal educational opportunity.
Higher education admissions create "winners" and "losers,"
admitting only some students. Moreover, the nonadmitted have no
guarantee of admission elsewhere.
Likewise, in government
contracting, some people are awarded contracts while others receive
smaller ones or none at all. Under these circumstances, individuals
are in direct competition with one another for finite resources.
When race is a factor in the award and denial of such benefits,
individuals can easily interpret the process as a competition
between racial groups. This perspective can further lead some to
characterize the outcome as controlled by racial politics rather than
307. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
308. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
309. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
310. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003) (discussing
Bakke as a case requiring sixteen out of one-hundred seats to go to minorities);
id. at 334 (characterizing law school admissions as a competition for available
seats and requiring race be limited in that process); Croson, 488 U.S. at 477
(evaluating a plan that required thirty percent of the contracts to go to
minorities).
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individual competition.3 11 Voluntary desegregation, in contrast, does
not involve finite resources. All students are assigned to a school,
and all schools should be roughly equal. Thus, even though race is a
factor in assignments, disgruntled parents would be hard-pressed to
suggest racial politics are at play and working to the substantive
disadvantage of their children.
In fact, what has been striking about voluntary school
desegregation plans is that they have overcome much of the racial
divisiveness of the past. Well-crafted voluntary desegregation plans
have garnered widespread support within both minority and white
communities.
Parents see the plans as offering school choices that
they otherwise would not have.
Whites who prefer their
neighborhood school can have it, but parents who wish to explore
other options have the freedom to do So.313 Minorities, likewise, see

the same benefit, particularly those who have previously clamored
for the ability to leave their neighborhood schools, which may have
formerly been racially isolated and burdened by poverty. 3 4 Most
important to the popularity of the plans among all groups is that the
quality of the schools overall is improved.
Even if upgrades are directed primarily at poorer schools, the
effect is to benefit all parents. First, upgrades help produce a school
system as a whole in which parents can invest and take pride, as
there are no schools of which to be ashamed or from which to flee.
This is instrumental in districts' attempts to attract better
administrators and teachers, maintain stability, and minimize the
costs of continually replenishing teaching staffs.316
Second,
311. See generally Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (discussing how racial
classifications may lead to competing racial factions).
312. Bazelon, supra note 33 (indicating that eighty-eight percent of parents
support voluntary desegregation); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch.
Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 349 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing actions to make
the plan popular among all demographics).
313. See, e.g., Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48.
314.

TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

164-65

(2001) (noting the appeal of vouchers and school choice among disadvantaged
minority communities).
315. See, e.g., Comfort, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34 (discussing the vast
improvement in school quality).
316. See HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, TEACHING INEQUALITY: How
POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 1-3

(2006) (analyzing the difficulties that minority schools face in securing quality
teachers), available at http://www2.edtrust.orgNR/rdonlyres/01ODBD9F-CED8
-4D2B-9EOD-91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf; see also GARY BARNES
ET AL., THE COST OF TEACHER TURNOVER IN FIVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

A

PILOT

4-5 (2007), available at http://www.nctaf.org/resources/demonstration
_projects/tumover/documents/CTTFullReportfinal.pdf (discussing national data

STUDY

on the cost of teacher turnover);

KAREN S. HERBERT & MICHAEL C. RAMSAY, TEX.
STATE BD. FOR EDUCATOR CERTIFICATION, THE COST OF TEACHER TURNOVER 9

(2004), available at http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBECOnline/reprtdatarsrch
/ReportforSenateEducationCommittee.pdf (discussing the financial drain that
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equalizing schools can produce a direct benefit for middle- and
lower-class whites. When the best schools are tied to the most
affluent neighborhoods, parents, including white parents, must
purchase their way into good schools. 17 In housing terms, "best"
and "whiteness" are almost synonymous among consumers. 318 It is

not that white neighborhoods are intrinsically better, but rather
that "whiteness" has a social value.3 9 Thus, homes of exactly the
same quality sell for different prices, depending on neighborhood
demographics.320 The whiter the neighborhood, the more the home
costs. 321

Because of this phenomena (driven by racial bias), home

owners
and 322
realtors seek to maintain the whiteness of their
•
neighborhood.
In a school system that provides equal schools, however, whites
who cannot afford the cost of "whiteness," or would rather invest
their resources elsewhere, can live in cheaper neighborhoods
without actually disadvantaging their children's education.
Regardless of where these parents live or purchase a home, they can
expect to send their children to a quality school. That school may be
their neighborhood school or one they attempt to gain admission to
elsewhere. From this perspective, disentangling residence from
school assignment has the potential to produce better schools as well
as to combat privilege. The phenomenon has not been explored
extensively, but the data from Louisville may provide a good
example of it in operation. Louisville found that, in contrast to
national urban trends, residential segregation has actually
decreased during its desegregation plan.323
teacher turnover causes in Texas).
317. Boger, supra note 57, at 1442.
318. See, e.g., Casey J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes
of Black-White Residential Segregation, 26 J. URB. AFF. 379, 390 (2004)
(discussing the higher price of homes in white neighborhoods); David R. Harris,
"Property Values Drop When Blacks Move In, Because. . .": Racial and
Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 AM. Soc. REV.
461, 461-63 (1999).
319. See generally Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A
PersonalAccount of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's
Studies, in POWER,PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 23 (Leslie

Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995) (describing whiteness, or white privilege,
as being "like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions,
assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass,
emergency gear, and blank checks"); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1669-70, 1672 (1995)
(discussing the impact of whiteness on housing opportunities).
320. Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and
Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 670 (2002).
321. See generally Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property Values in
Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1059-60 (1998).
322. Id. at 1057.
323. The residential integration began during the period of forced school
integration, but has continued. Brief for Respondents at 3, Parents Involved in
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Finally, voluntary desegregation plans avoid racial politics
because they do not threaten to work new injustices in the process of
remedying old injustices. Detractors have previously objected to
plans because they feared the plans would work
affirmative
••
..action
324
When the perpetrator of a harm and its direct
new injustices.
causes cannot be identified exactly, remedying the harm poses the
risk of overcompensating for harm and, in the process, extracting
325
that remedy from the wrong defendant or innocent third parties.
Voluntary desegregation plans do not pose these concerns because
they are not remedies for past discrimination or attempts at
corrective justice. They are simply efforts to operate equitable
systems in the here and now. Their goal is to curtail current racial
biases from operating upon the school system. Moreover, even to
the extent one applied corrective justice principles to this goal,
schools implementing voluntary desegregation plans are responding
with more precision and certainty than would programs responding
to old injustices because the schools are reacting to current
phenomena. Thus, the possibility of working new injustices is
further minimized.
In sum, voluntary desegregation plans are not zero-sum games
that ferment racial politics or work new injustices. Rather, they
reflect the adage that a rising tide lifts all boats. They improve
school systems overall and, in the process, all schools. Thus, they
are popular among all demographics. In this respect, they help to
heal old racial wounds and reverse trends, such as those in housing,
that have previously proven intractable.
7.

Subordinationof Values

The only potential stigmatic harm of voluntary desegregation
unexplored fully thus far is an expressive harm related to the
Expressive harms result when
subordination of values.
traditionally relevant factors are subordinated to race. 6 In vote
redistricting, this subordination was exemplified by bizarrely
shaped majority minority districts that included most all possible

Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915), 2006
WL 2944684.
324. Robert J. Delahunty, "ConstitutionalJustice"or "ConstitutionalPeace"?
The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 26-28
(2008) (discussing corrective justice arguments against affirmative action).
325. Affirmative action in employment, for instance, has been susceptible to
such charges. Although an employer has previously discriminated among job
applicants, those applicants tend to move on. Thus, when courts later order
remedial hiring policies that rely heavily on race or quotas, the benefit accrues
to new minority applicants who may have never been discriminated against by
Likewise, the remedy may disadvantage current white
the employer.
applicants who did not previously benefit from discrimination. Brest, supra
note 96, at 36-40.
326. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 501, 507.
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minority neighborhoods while districting out some white
communities. 27 The Court, however, was clear that a bizarrely
shaped
district alone is not a basis to challenge
I-J • J.voting
328
redistricting.
Rather, the bizarreness correlated with race and,
thus, indicated that the traditional values of compactness and
contiguousness were subjugated to race.3

29

The Court was, likewise,

clear that only predominant considerations of race, not racial
considerations in general, are problematic.
Kennedy does not suggest any expressive harm of this sort
results from voluntary desegregation.
His concern with the
predominance of race is not with the subordination of values, but
with the subordination of individuality discussed above. Although
the two are distinct, one might equate the two. Thus, subordination
of values is still worth addressing.
Ultimately, voluntary desegregation neither overlooks nor
subordinates any important values to race. In fact, the schools'
desire to offer and honor parental choice is the factor that, more
than race or any other factor, drives the assignment process. 3 3 0 Race

can be the final decisive factor in some instances, but it is not the
predominant factor as a general matter. When parental choices
by
S
331
themselves produce racially balanced schools, race is not a factor.
Only when parental choices alone do not produce racial balance does
race become a factor, but it still only applies
to
S•
332 the limited number
of assignments necessary to maintain balance.
However, parental
preference, along with other special circumstances, such as sibling
placement, remains relevant.333 Only by focusing on the assignment
of an individual student at the very final stage, and ignoring the
preceding steps and all the other assignments that have been made
without regard to race, can one charge that race predominates.
Even then, the question remains as to what traditional or
legitimate factors voluntary desegregation could subordinate to race.
327. Id. at 494-95.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d
834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004) ("Prior to any consideration of a student's race, a
myriad of other factors, such as place of residence, school capacity, program
popularity, random draw and nature of the student's choices, will have a more
significant effect on school assignment." ).
331. Id. at 847 (discussing a school where seats where still available after
names were assigned from a list, thus race would not have affected any of those
students' assignments).
332. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-915), 2006 WLb 3486966 (stating race is
dispositive in only two to three percent of assignments).
333. See, e.g., McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (noting a myriad of other
factors); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 349
(D. Mass. 2003) (noting that sibling unification, hardship, etc. would override
race).
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Voluntary desegregation still honors geography and locality by
either guaranteeing admission to a neighborhood school or creating
school choices that correspond with one's larger neighborhood.3 34
Individual autonomy is also honored, as no plans mandatorily
assign students to non-neighborhood schools or schools for which
they express no preference.
For these reasons, voluntary
desegregation plans regularly leave pockets of racial imbalance. 5
Ultimately, parental preferences are a limiting factor on racial
balance, not vice versa. Thus, if any value is subordinated it would
be racial integration.
D.

Justice Kennedy's Conflation of Stigmatic Harms
As the above discussion demonstrates, voluntary desegregation
plans do not stigmatize students. In many respects, the plans are
simply unique. They do not involve merit selections, pursue
diversity as a primary end, or make individualized judgments. They
are not premised on notions of black inferiority, racial stereotypes,
or differences in racial value. Nor do they involve racial politics or
subordinate important values. At most, some plans have employed
overbroad racial categories, but such categories are not inherent to
voluntary desegregation plans. They can be remedied simply by
Thus, race-based voluntary
employing appropriate categories.
desegregation plans can avoid stigmatic harms in all respects.
Kennedy's opinion, however, may rest on a theory of stigma that
goes beyond the margins of all previously conceived harms. His
insistence on the existence of harm here arises out of his conflation
of what are two distinct forms of stigma into one. He borrows from
both the theory of general expressive harms flowing from the
subordination of values and the theory of stigmatic harms flowing
from a disregard of individuality. In borrowing from both, he turns
individuality into a value that cannot be subordinated,
notwithstanding the fact that voluntary desegregation plans do not
make individualized assessments.
Expressive harms flow from the subordination of relevant
traditional values. 6 The Court, however, does not have the
authority to unilaterally proclaim what values "should" be
considered. Rather, the Court identifies those values that the
government has considered in the past or are necessarily relevant in
light of the government's current legitimate goals.337 For instance,
334. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)
(guaranteeing neighborhood schools); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842-44
(creating a larger attendance zone, within which one can express school
preferences).
335. See, e.g., Comfort, 418 F.3d at 8 (indicating that five schools were still
racially imbalanced under the plan).
336. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 500-01.
337. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (requiring adherence
to "traditional redistricting principles").
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compactness, contiguousness, and other voting values are not
protected in redistricting because the Court believes those values
are important; the Court protects those values because the state
itself has previously treated them as important.338 Similarly, in
educational diversity programs, the Court does not require
universities to consider diversity factors beyond race, such as special
talents or unique experiences, because the Court believes those
individuals should be admitted or given special consideration.
Rather, the requirement exists because, if a school's stated goal is
diversity (not just racial diversity), those other characteristics are
necessarily important to the decision.339 In short, the government's
past practices and values, or the values rationally related to its
current goals, will determine the values to which it must adhere.
Kennedy's opinion runs afoul of this principle by taking liberty
with the values at stake and ends pursued in voluntary
desegregation. Individuality is not at stake because, as discussed
throughout this Article, voluntary desegregation is not a selection or
merit-based process. In fact, with the exception of specialized
magnet schools that admit only high-performing or special needs
students or base admissions decisions on student interests,
individualized student assignment is an entirely foreign concept to
public schools. Thus, individuality is simply not a value to which
schools have traditionally adhered, nor a value relevant to the ends
they are currently pursuing. In contrast, race, both for good and bad
reasons, has always been an animating value in our public schools. 340
To consider it now, for purposes Kennedy recognizes are legitimate,
is not to introduce a new value to schools or subordinate
individuality or any other values.
Kennedy's opinion, however, obfuscates these points and treats
individualism as a sacrosanct value and inherent end. In effect, he
forces individualism as a value upon the schools. His opinion
initially indicates a school district has only two options: use race in a
general manner or use race to make individual decisions, with race
being only one component of those decisions .3 ' The rest of the
decision largely limits schools' options to pursue diversity. First, as
Justice Breyer notes in dissent, the general uses of race Kennedy
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (requiring
consideration of all pertinent factors); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (rejecting the notion that diversity is simply an interest in
"ethnic diversity"); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding diversity that focused only on racial diversity amounted to nothing less
than racial balancing).
340. See generally BELL, supra note 263, at 137-60 (discussing the historical
evolution of race-based schooling).
341. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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suggests will not eliminate racial isolation. 2 Thus, they are not a
real option. Second, although Kennedy indicates that eliminating
racial isolation is a compelling interest, he does not distinguish
between eliminating racial isolation and achieving diversity. Thus,
the standards
for achieving diversity are the only ones he
•
3
provides.
Third, he makes what appear to be blanket statements that
would necessarily limit schools to diversity. For instance, he writes:
"What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of
necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of
race and to assign each of them to schools based on that
classification. ''344 Such statements suggests that any time a school
uses race and assigns students one at a time, it must engage in
individualized review. This approach falsely assumes that when
race is considered the school is making an individualized decision
rather than a group decision. The result is to elevate individualism
to a preeminent value that must be considered any time race is
considered in student assignments.
Yet forcing individualized merit review upon a system
motivated by other legitimate ends, to which individualism is
irrelevant, is an inappropriate use of judicial power. First, although
judicial skepticism of racial classification is warranted given our
history, it does not justify prophylactic rules. Kennedy himself
rejects such rules in word,345 but in practice he makes individualism
into a subtle prophylactic requirement. However, if voluntary
desegregation is unique and does not perpetrate any stigmatic
harm, courts need not treat it as they would other programs.
Second, when a school does not make individualized reviews in
desegregation, it has not diverged from any prior pattern and
practice, nor subordinated any relevant values. The only way to
reach a contrary conclusion is to elevate individualism to a place of
overarching importance in all governmental decisions. In short,
voluntary desegregation simply does not stigmatize anyone on any
basis.
Kennedy's suggestion to the contrary is based on a
misunderstanding of stigma and the creation of an expressive harm
that does not exist in reality.
E.

Voluntary Desegregationas an Antistigmatic Message
Rather than conveying stigmatic messages, voluntary

342. Id. at 2828 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (there is no "reason to believe that
another method is possible to accomplish these goals").
343. See id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (providing guidance only as to the consideration of diversity factors
other than race).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 2791-92 (rejecting colorblindness as a universal constitutional
principle).
HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 168 2009

2009]

ALL THINGS ARE NOT EQUAL

desegregation

actually

conveys

an

antistigmatic

message.

346

Moreover, this message takes on additional importance because it
comes from schools. For the first time in the history of school
desegregation, schools themselves are sending the antistigmatic
message.
Previous desegregation was based on mandatory court
S
347
orders. Thus, even to the extent the message was antistigmatic, it
was not the schools' message. In fact, the many schools vigorously
resisted the message."'
Schools' current voluntary efforts to
desegregate indicate that they have finally heard and received the
Court's messages. That schools, like the Court, use race to express
the message, however, does not change the message from an
antistigmatic one to a stigmatic one.
Kennedy is correct that race matters,3 4 9 and he may be correct
that racial classifications convey a message to individuals. His
oversight is in regard to how race matters. Race matters in the way
society makes it matter and with the messages it uses race to
convey. Race and stigma are social constructs and, thus, they have
no predetermined message.9 ° In voluntary desegregation, schools
use race to send a positive message. Moreover, sending appropriate
messages and fostering positive values, as the Court has always
recognized, are at the heart of the purpose behind public schools. 3 1
In particular, voluntary desegregation is used to convey a
message that a school district is a community of one.353 Brest
asserts that racial discrimination and selective indifference are
expressions of internalized feelings or notions that racial groups are

346. Siegel, supra note 30, at 837-38 (distinguishing voluntary
desegregation from other affirmative action plans based on its message).
347. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (ordering
school districts to desegregate now).
348. See, e.g., id.; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15 (1958).
349. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("The enduring hope is that race should not
matter; the reality is that too often it does.").
350. Lenhardt, supra note 95, at 821-22; L6pez, supra note 12, at 27-28.

351. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72
(1988) (upholding the authority of public school officials to censor a student
newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (upholding the
discipline of a student for vulgar speech based on a public school's authority to
promote good civic values); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
640-42 (1943) (finding that compelling students to salute the American flag
while at school was inimical to fostering the message of "intellectual
individualism" that was public schools' responsibility to engender); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (noting the power of the State to
reasonably regulate public schools to ensure that "certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship... be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923) (noting that a teacher's "calling . . .always has been regarded as

useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare").
352. See, e.g., McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
854 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
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of differential value."' Voluntary desegregation counteracts this
notion with a message that indicates the quality of every school in a
district matters. Thus, the quality of African-American students'
educational opportunities is equal in importance to whites', making
it unacceptable to allow some schools to languish while others
prosper. In short, school districts are putting the community on
notice3 4that the district has a collective responsibility and is receptive
to it.

A voluntarily desegregating district also conveys a second
message that private bias and predilection will not dominate and
shape the way the school district educates children. Instead, a
principle of equity will direct the schools. Making this affirmative
statement can be crucial in orienting parents', teachers', and
students' approach to the schools.355
In effect, the school is
reaffirming the basic principle on which it should stand: that public
schools are public and, thus, will promote democratic values.
Moreover, if a parent is going to live or a teacher is going to work in
the district, they too must buy into these principles. Without
question, some will object to aspects of these principles, but setting
them rests in the authority of the community as expressed through
its school board, not in that of individual parents.5 6 The point of the
schools' message is not to stigmatize individuals or deprive persons
of the ability to go to particular schools. Rather, the point is to
make race irrelevant to those who would otherwise think or make it
relevant. In this respect, voluntary desegregation conveys the best
and most important of expressive messages.
IV. PARENTS INVOLVED AS COMPROMISE RATHER THAN PRINCIPLE

A.

FindingCompromise in Contradiction
If voluntary desegregation occasions neither material nor
stigmatic harm, the question remains as to why Justice Kennedy
cast the deciding vote as he did. Either he was honestly mistaken in
many of his assumptions, or the very contradictions of his opinion
signal another end. The internal contradictions of Kennedy's
opinion speak as much to diametrically opposed ideological positions
as they do to the particulars of voluntary desegregation. At various
points in his opinion, Kennedy seeks to legitimize the positions of
both sides of the debate over race consciousness, with voluntary
desegregation as just the happenstance backdrop. He echoes the
353. Brest, supra note 96, at 8.
354. As Brown notes, this is particularly important because it is often
private values that the school must counteract. Brown, supra note 51, at 48.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 17 (concluding that children have a right to be inculcated with
those values consistent with constitutional principles, not with their own
personal beliefs).
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general mantras of civil rights and racial justice advocates at certain
points, only to balance or undermine them with the general mantras
of colorblindness or conservatism elsewhere.
For instance, he concurs with civil rights rhetoric when he
writes: "The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the
reality is that too often it does ....

The plurality's postulate that

'[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race' is not sufficient to decide these
cases."3 57 Likewise, although he applauds the concept expressed in
Justice Harlan dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson361 that "[olur
Constitution is color-blind," 359 Kennedy concludes that "[i]n the real

world, it is regrettable to say, [colorblindness] cannot be a universal
constitutional principle."36 °
Kennedy, however, just as boisterously expresses rhetorical
language at odds with the foregoing. In his opening paragraph,
Kennedy writes: "To make race matter now so that it might not
matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to
overcome." 36 His expansion of this notion throughout his opinion
motivates his concerns over individuality and correlates with his
warning that these plans threaten to reduce children to racial
chits.362 Thus,

although he

states colorblindness

cannot be a

universal principal, a rhetoric consistent with colorblindness forms
the basis of his reversal of these desegregation plans.
The competition between these ideological poles, however,
extends beyond rhetorical statements. Kennedy holds that schools
have a compelling interest in pursuing diversity and addressing the
effects of racial isolation.363 This holding is a rebuke to those who
object to all nonremedial uses of race. In response to them, Kennedy
writes:
School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open
to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the
plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that
state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of
racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly
357. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted); see also id. at 2767-68 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)).
358. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 559.
360. Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
361. Id. at 2788.
362. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
363. ParentsInvolved, 127 S.Ct. at 2797.
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mistaken.3
Kennedy, however, as a practical matter, undermines this idea
just as solidly as he makes it by severely limiting the means by
which schools can achieve this end. Although recognizing the
elimination of racial isolation as a compelling interest, he fails to
account for the actual harms and the race-conscious remedies
necessary to address them, effectively making his compelling
interest holding irrelevant. As discussed previously, he transforms
the desegregation plans into diversity plans, requiring a Grutterstyle analysis, regardless of whether diversity is the intended end.
The competition between ideological sides also manifests itself
in the basic application of strict scrutiny. Kennedy praises the
schools' ends, writing:
The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes
from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in
commitment to the freedom of all. In these cases two school
districts in different parts of the country seek to teach that
principle by having classrooms that reflect the racial makeup
of the surrounding community. That the school districts
consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our
highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled.3 65
Thus, by his own admission Kennedy establishes that voluntary
desegregation, unlike other race-conscious plans, does not pose an
ambiguity of purpose where the Court has no way of knowing
whether a plan is benign or malevolent.3 66 Moreover, the absence of
a concrete, material harm further distinguishes voluntary
desegregation.
Kennedy, however, elsewhere retreats to a
skepticism of all racial classifications, including those in
desegregation plans, writing: "Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no
way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial'
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."367 Kennedy could have
distinguished voluntary desegregation from this precedent, but by
refusing to, he subjects it to a narrow-tailoring analysis that renders
these measures unconstitutional.
Consistent with his validation of both sides, however, Kennedy
reserves a partial victory for civil rights advocates regarding strict
scrutiny. In fact, he indicates he would not question a school's
motivations if they stopped short of classifying individuals by race.
364. Id. at 2791.
365. Id. at 2788.
366. For a discussion of why strict scrutiny is required in such situations,
see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying
strict scrutiny).
367. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
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School districts "are free to devise race-conscious measures to
address the problem [of de facto segregation] in a general way."3'6
And if their measures do not classify individual students by race,
Kennedy writes, "it is unlikely [they] would demand strict
scrutiny. 3 69 As promising as such a holding might be, Justice
Stevens's dissent reveals that the general uses of race that Kennedy
Thus, this
suggests will not lead to effective desegregation.
principle is less meaningful in reality than in word.
As the above demonstrates, Kennedy's opinion is riddled with
what appear to be internally contradictory principles. Taken to its
logical conclusion, some statements in his opinion provide a basis
upon which to justify most any voluntary desegregation plan one
could imagine. These portions, in effect, would render voluntary
desegregation a special exemption to strict scrutiny and provide
latitude in its uses of race. But other portions of his opinion provide
a basis to prohibit the use of race in any respect to achieve voluntary
desegregation.
Although the details of voluntary desegregation are unique, the
ideological issues that Parents Involved raises are not unlike those
in many other race cases. On an ideological level, Parents Involved
retreads the same loggerhead that has preceded it. Advocates on
one side believe there is a distinction between malevolent and
benign uses of race,37 ° and also that race-consciousness is an
absolute necessity in accounting for and responding to past and
current racial inequity and discrimination.Y In contrast, the other
side believes that the use of race is only justified when necessary to
remedy acts of intentional discrimination. 2 In all other instances,
strict colorblindness is the only means to ensure that individuals are
treated equally.373 The dilemma in cases such as ParentsInvolved is
that no principled middle ground can be had between these polemic
positions. And to sanction the argument of either would be to
ensure a complete victory for one and deal a death blow to the other.
Thus, Kennedy takes neither side but rather picks and chooses from
both.
368. Id. at 2792.
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 735 (1974); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REV.

753, 789-90, 798 (1985) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to prohibit benevolent affirmative action programs).
371. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1079-91 (1991).
372. L. Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative
Action is the Right Thing to Do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L.
REV. 533, 534 (1997); Posner, supra note 299, at 19; see also City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
373. Posner, supra note 299, at 25. See generally TERRY EASTLAND,ENDING
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996).
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A comparison of Kennedy's opinion to those in the redistricting
cases suggests we should interpret Kennedy's opinion as nothing
less than a compromise. Pildes and Niemi point out that the voting
cases involved a collision between alternating concepts of political
representation," 4 and the Court's holdings were ultimately a
compromise between these differing views.
The difficulty of the
compromise, however, results in decisions that appear internally
inconsistent or unprincipled because they fail to follow the various
competing principles that they validate to their logical
conclusions.376
Delahunty concludes that affirmative action or race-conscious
cases, in particular, have precipitated these compromises. He
likewise finds that these compromises lead to unprincipled and
illogical decisions. 7
Delahunty, however, suggests that the
compromise may be far more than the ideological battle than Pildes
and Niemi contemplate. Delahunty characterizes these cases as
attempts to secure a "constitutional peace" between aggressively
competing constituencies.3 78 The issues in Bakke, for instance, posed
the threat of racial conflict.3 7 9

At the time, minorities were

demanding full remedial or corrective action as a response to
380
decades of discrimination.
In contrast, many whites were
resentful of affirmative action remedies based on imprecisely
identified harms. Such remedies could work new injustices and
undermine whites' economic and social status.381 Confronted with
this conflict, the Court secured a constitutional peace by relying on a
diversity rationale that sidestepped the demands of both sides and
rested on grounds that made neither happy, but with which both
could live. 2
Compromise decisions, however, leave the core ideological
issues undecided and permit the tension between the two poles to
persist. Yet Pildes and Niemi reason that compromise standards
and continued tension can produce a net good because they force
governmental decision makers to continually consider the values on
both sides, thus ensuring that no legitimate values are
subordinated 3 Pildes and Niemi's notion is heavily contextualized
by what they see as the nature of the political process, but
374. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 483.
375. Id. at 505-06.
376. Id.
377. Delahunty, supra note 324, at 18.
378. Id. at 54.
379. Id. (quoting JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 470
(2001)).
380. Id. at 54-56 (discussing the black power movement and civil
disobedience).
381. Id. at 44.
382. Id. at 43-46.
383. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 505-06.
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Delahunty makes a similar point. He writes that compromise cases
are amoral decisions that express an utter indifference to issues
such as racial justice, but it is only amorality that allows the Court
to secure peace: "And peace, no less than justice, is a great good."3 8
Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved demonstrates several of
these same characteristics. It involves an ideological competition
that he, ultimately, does not resolve. Rather, his opinion is riddled
with inconsistencies as it vacillates between the poles.
Most
tellingly, he almost entirely avoids the central motivation and
necessity of voluntary desegregation-the negative educational
impacts of racial isolation-so as to focus on and extend the
diversity compromise first rendered in Bakke and repeated in
Grutter. Moreover, the need for and pull of compromise likely
weighs heavily upon him now that he sits at the center of the Court,
just as Powell did in Bakke and O'Connor in Grutter.
The flaw in his opinion, however, is the notion that Parents
Involved raises the same interests that were at stake in Bakke and
Grutter, and that necessitated a constitutional peace.
In the
context of higher education in Bakke and Grutter, diversity
admissions arouse white interests in tempering affirmative action
plans and jeopardize race-neutral admissions policies that, by the
percentages, are to whites' advantage.
Likewise, the vote
redistricting cases pitted established voting patterns, traditional
political power, and geographic cohesiveness against the interests of
minorities in improved political representation.
Competing interests of this nature, however, are not present in
voluntary desegregation. Without question, some people may be
concerned only with individual prerogative and see no connection
between the overall health of a school district and the health of
individual schools, communities, and workplaces.
But these
interests are not in competition with African-American interests in
particular; they are at odds with the interests of the overall
community, which finds value in these plans .3 5 Thus, to the extent
these interests even compete against voluntary desegregation, they
lack a significant constituency. Moreover, as Pildes and Niemi note,
the disgruntlement of a few individuals is not sufficient to sustain a
claim of constitutional expressive harm.386 Only the wholesale
expressive harm to a group, resulting from subordination of
communal values to race, gives rise to such a claim." 7 As discussed
extensively above, voluntary desegregation plans simply do not

384. Delahunty, supranote 324, at 70.
385. See, e.g., Comfort ex rel. Neumeyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp.
2d 328, 349 (D. Mass. 2003) (discussing actions that made the plan popular
among all demographics); Bazelon, supra note 33, at 43 (discussing an eightyeight percent parental support rating for Louisville's desegregation plan).
386. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 506-07.
387. Id. at 513-15.
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create that type of harm.
The compromise in Parents Involved, therefore, is not one
necessitated by a meaningful conflict of interest between racial or
other demographic groups. Rather, it is ultimately a compromise
between ideological viewpoints. One could, at least, posit that
voluntary
desegregation plans threaten the ideology of
colorblindness and extreme individualism, or the politics of
entitlement and privilege that allow a select few to purchase
educational advantages through the housing market. 388 But these
ideologies would appear seemingly irrelevant to most parents who
have limited options in securing quality educational opportunities
for their children. Yet by elevating the ideology of individualism to
a level on par with the substantial interests in voluntary
desegregation, Kennedy's opinion artificially necessitates a
compromise and divides the spoils at the expense of the collective
judgment of the school community.
B.

Opportunity in Compromise
The inconsistency and indefiniteness of Justice Kennedy's
opinion, however, is also its saving grace. In so far as the opinion
balances ideology rather than secures specific outcomes, its purpose
may be merely to make an ideological statement.
Kennedy
reaffirms colorblindness by stressing the crude nature of the plans'
racial categories and reaffirms individuality by demanding that race
cannot be the single individual criterion in assignments. 3 9 But his
opinion, on a practical level, contemplates that schools should be
allowed to achieve the exact ends they desire. He even leaves open
the possibility that schools could rely on their current plans if they
could demonstrate a necessity in doing so. 390

The school districts'

failure was one of proof, and Kennedy does not rule out the
possibility that they could overcome this failure in the future.391
Thus; his opinion is carefully tempered in important respects.
Some school districts should be able to show this necessity. In
fact, the history of failed race-neutral desegregation efforts in
Comfort ex rel. Neumeyer v. Lynn School Committee appears to
make this showing. 392 Even with its current plan, Lynn considered

388. See PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 57, at 5
(noting that nontraditional assignment plans, such as mandatory desegregation
assignments, "likely will face opposition from some middle-class parents who
believe that with their home selection, they have 'purchased' the right to send
their children to economically homogeneous neighborhood public schools").
389. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2745 (2007).
390. Id. at 2797.
391. Id.
392. 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344-47 (D. Mass. 2003) (reviewing the previous
failed attempt to achieve successful desegregation).
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and studied extensive race-neutral alternatives,"' thus going beyond
Seattle's and Louisville's efforts.
Regardless of whether the
alternatives are realistic, the symbolic value of exhausting them is
meaningful from an ideological perspective. Thus, one might argue
that Seattle's and Louisville's plans were not inherently flawed, but
rather the flaw was in their failure to substantiate the need for the
plans.
Kennedy's only unambiguous stance in the case is his objection
to "crude" racial classifications.3 94
Otherwise, he is at least
theoretically open to the use of race as a determining factor. Even
to the extent he prefers a multivariable diversity analysis over a
race-determinate one, he would require an analysis less complex
than that detailed in Grutter. Grutter requires holistic individual
assessments of students, in which no single factor is
determinative.395 But in Parents Involved, Kennedy pays scant
attention to other factors. He simply indicates: "Race may be one
component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus
special talents and needs, should also be considered." 96
One could envision a process that simply expanded the
demographic groups that are equally sorted among schools. Doing
so would not limit racial desegregation or the role that race plays in
decisions. Rather, it would simply add other decisive factors. For
instance, students could be sorted into schools based on race. Then
they could again be sorted based on special education or needs
status. Thus, if an African-American special-education student
expressed a preference for two schools that were predominantly
white, but one school had fewer special-needs students than the
other, the district would assign the student to the school with fewer
special-needs students, even if that school was the student's second
preference. Under previous plans, the student would have gotten
his first choice.
The overall effect of such a plan would be to set imbalance levels
for race, special needs, and/or other social factors like income.
Consequently, the plan could not be reduced to one in which race
was entirely decisive, but rather the plan would have multiple
decisive factors, equitably distributing students among schools
based on multiple characteristics. The primary drawback of such a
plan is that it would, as the example shows, reduce the weight given
to parental preferences and, hence, the plans' popularity. Moreover,
this point simply reaffirms that choice, more than anything, drove
assignments in the old plans. Regardless, changes of this sort could
respond to Kennedy's concerns without affecting the overall level of

393. Id. at 335.
394. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2745.
395. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-42 (2003).
396. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797.
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97

At this point, it suffices to say that Kennedy's opinion leaves
open additional options for achieving voluntary desegregation.
First, although they have their limitations, Kennedy notes several
himself in his discussion of "general" uses of race to draw school
boundaries or site new schools. 98
Second, others have also
suggested that socioeconomic status is a measure by which to
desegregate schools.399
However, the effectiveness of these
alternatives is particularly dependent on circumstances.
For
instance, plans based on socioeconomics can certainly reduce
socioeconomic isolation, but they will not yield significant levels of
racial desegregation in most geographical locations. 00 Moreover,
even when socioeconomic desegregation occurs, without racial
desegregation, the schools will still allow for the perception of white
and black schools. This perception can then still lead to other
problems of school inequity discussed above. With that said, using
socioeconomic status, along with race and potentially other factors,
could reduce racial segregation, as well as respond to Kennedy's
concerns about single-factor race decisions.
Some schools, for
instance, have created "diversity indexes" that assign particular
weights to race, housing segregation, family income, family
education, and analogous factors.0 1 The schools then use the index
to assign students to schools.4 2 If these factors are weighted
appropriately, they may produce desegregation on par with purely
race-conscious measures. 403
The primary concern with many of these multivariable
assignment plans is their administrative burden or feasibility.
Collecting the necessary data, calculating a workable index, and
then administering these options may not be immediately feasible
for many districts.
Many would lack the financial and staff
397. See generally STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 46-59
(reviewing various plans that rely on factors in addition to or other than race).
398. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.

399. PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 57, at 5;
McUsic, supra note 57, at 1335.
400. See Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 49, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL 2927079; Sean F. Reardon et
al., Implications of Income-Based School Assignment Policies for Racial School
Segregation,EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS, Spring 2006, at 50.
401. See, e.g.,
BERKELEY
UNIFIED
SCH.
DIST.,
BUSD STUDENT
ASSIGNMENT
PLAN/POLICY,
http://www.berkeley.netlindex.php?page=student
-assignment-plan [hereinafter BERKELEY ASSIGNMENT PLAN].

402. Id.
403. For further discussion of these indexes, see STILL LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE, supra note 56, at 46-47, 52-53, 56-57.

404. Compare City of Berkeley, Who We Are, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us
/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=7164 (indicating that over sixty percent of its
population has a bachelors or professional degree), with Nicole Stoops, Current
Population Reports, in

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
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resources needed to implement them.
And those who have the
capacity would be utilizing these resources, possibly for no reason
other than to obfuscate their constitutionally legitimate end of
reducing racial isolation. These resources could be saved with plans
that rely more heavily on race. The savings could fund important
educational objectives rather than administrative ones.
Regardless of what option school districts pursue, reviewing
courts should be careful to not broadly construe the restrictive
portions of Parents Involved. Lower courts should recognize that
Kennedy did not condemn voluntary desegregation, but struck a
complicated comprise. He sanctioned the schools' purposes and
indicated that he would contemplate sanctioning their particular
methods under the right circumstances. As indicated above, the
purpose of a compromise decision is to ensure that all legitimate
values are considered. So long as schools do so, courts should not
strike down their plans and, in the process, subordinate the value in
voluntary racial desegregation to other ideological ends. Just as
schools send
messages with their plans, so do courts with
1 06
decisions.
Those that too broadly construe the prohibitions from
Parents Involved will send the message that schools cannot devise
plans that rely on race to desegregate schools.0 Kennedy is clear
that this should not occur. Moreover, Parents Involved does not
change the long-standing deference courts owe to schools regarding
their judgment as to how to educate children.4 8 Once a district
decides equitable, adequate, desegregated schools are in children's
best interests, courts must not create unjustified barriers.
The key in maintaining this balance is for courts to appreciate
2003, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20
-550.pdf (indicating that the national average is half that of Berkley), and
BERKELEY ASSIGNMENT PLAN, supra note 401 (indicating that Berkeley, unlike
many school districts, is particularly affluent).
405. Most racially isolated schools are already resource-deprived. See, e.g.,
CARMEN G. ARROYO, EDUC. TRUST, THE FUNDING GAP (2007), available at

http://www.nvasb.orgfPublications/ResearchData/thefunding-gap.pdf; see also
McUsic, supra note 57, at 1351-52 (discussing the higher costs minority
districts face and the insufficient funds they have to meet them).
406. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2028-29 (1996).
407. See STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, supra note 56, at 23-24 (responding
to the confusion Parents Involved created and its potentially discouraging
messages); see also Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives'Passion for the
Unattainable,94 VA. L. REV. 495, 496 (2008) (finding a clear message that the
majority of justices on the current Supreme Court will "strike down any laws or
policies intended to remedy past and continuing racial discrimination").
408. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988);
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985) (affording deference to institutions of
higher education).
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the factual predicate of Parents Involved. Although the Supreme
Court reaches holdings based on specific facts-or the lack thereof in
Parents Involved-sometimes lower courts ignore the precise
predicate, particularly in cases that address sensitive issues such as
race.4 " Lower courts may seize upon the broad principles on which
the Supreme Court seemingly relied.1 0 If they do, the result would
be to
extend
principles to facts in a way that the Court did not
•
411
intend.
In Parents Involved, those key facts revolved around
whether other alternatives were sufficient to reduce segregation. 412
In the absence of affirmative evidence by the school districts, Justice
Kennedy was free to assume that individual racial classifications
were not narrowly tailored. 4 " The second key factual issue was the
certainty regarding the manner in which race was used. This
Article posits that race was not the sole factor in assignments, but
the schools' failure to clearly articulate how race factored into the
process left Kennedy free to speculate that it was inappropriate.4 14
However, if a district substantiates its position on these points,
Kennedy's preference for diversity or individualized review may be
irrelevant. In short, Parents Involved must be read in context and
used as a tool to facilitate voluntary desegregation, not limit it.
Otherwise, the ideological compromise will become a total victory in
practice for those who oppose race-conscious measures.
CONCLUSION

Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved raises as many
questions as it answers. Yet every question is of utmost importance
both to our future understanding of race and to the future of
educational opportunities in America. The unique circumstances of
voluntary desegregation force Kennedy to revisit very basic
questions about the effect of racial classifications on citizens. When
these classifications are used to denigrate and divide, their effects
are obvious. Sometimes they are coupled with denials of job and
educational opportunities, while at other times they only stigmatize.
Regardless, as the Court has always recognized, the stigmatizing
effects of racial classifications are no less pernicious than their
material effects.
Voluntary desegregation, however, provides the opportunity to
explore a concrete alternative to our old patterns of misusing race.
It presents a context entirely different from all previous ones
409. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 141, at 523-24.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
413. Id. at 2789-90.
414. Id.
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because, although it relies on race, it does not use race as a
preference for any particular group, nor does it allocate benefits and
burdens. Thus, unlike affirmative action, it does not create winners
and losers. Rather, it simply sorts students into racially balanced
schools, where everyone receives an equal and quality education. By
rendering traditional concerns irrelevant, voluntary desegregation
allows us to focus on the core question of whether racial
classifications inherently stigmatize individuals.
The answer is encouraging. One can ponder any number of
ways that race has previously stigmatized individuals and, in each
case, voluntary desegregation avoids the problem. In fact, the point
of voluntary desegregation is to counteract stigma. The unfortunate
truth is that the history of de jure school segregation has not left us,
and the invidious racial values that it indoctrinated continue to
linger. As a result, parents and teachers make decisions based on
race that only further exacerbate inequality.
Voluntarily
desegregating schools, however, does not run from this reality; it
confronts it. By creating racially balanced schools, voluntary
desegregation attempts to make our racial biases irrelevant. For
once, it makes us choose our schools based on factors other than
race. In short, it uses race to make race irrelevant. Moreover, by
making race irrelevant, and schools better, it succeeds where all
other desegregation measures have failed: it wins the support and
collaboration of both whites and communities of color.
Our failures and divisions, however, run far too deep to assume
that we have crossed a milestone and cannot be turned back. In
fact, it is not even clear that Justice Kennedy appreciated the
distinction between achieving diversity and eliminating the harmful
educational effects of racial isolation. Rather, his opinion reveals a
greater concern with balancing competing ideologies than with
securing the future of our schools. That future remains very much
in jeopardy. Across the nation, many schools experienced significant
integration starting in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s, but
they have lost ground ever since and are as segregated today as they
were in 1970.4'5

Moreover, although their numbers are growing,

voluntarily desegregating school districts are far from a large
contingent.416
With that said, these school districts are the
unmistakable flowering of Brown's lessons. They have gone from
using race to divide to using it to unite. They have gone from being
districts concerned with the education of the few to ones concerned
415. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD UNIV. CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT,
BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSYS NIGHTMARE? 19 (2004), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg4brown50.pdf.
416. See generally James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary
Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 145 (2007) ("[Elven if we accept the highest
estimate-that roughly 1,000 school districts make some use of race when
assigning students-that still leaves approximately 15,000 school districts that
do not.").
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with the many. Parents Involved strikes a tenuous balance that
would allow them to grow. Emphasizing the context of voluntary
desegregation and the factual predicates of Kennedy's opinion will
be crucial in ensuring that lower courts do not interrupt that
balance.

HeinOnline -- 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 182 2009

